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I. INTRODUCTION 
A brand-name pharmaceutical company typically obtains a patent 
for its newly developed drug in order to protect its intellectual 
property.  If another company expresses its intent to market a generic 
version of the drug, the Hatch-Waxman Act authorizes the brand-name 
company to sue preemptively for patent infringement.1  Parties to the 
lawsuit may settle at any time, but antitrust issues arise when the 
settlement involves a “reverse payment” in exchange for delayed 
generic entry (also called “pay for delay”).  The Supreme Court in 
Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc. described a reverse payment 
settlement as follows: 
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement.  The 
two companies settle under terms that require (1) Company 
B, the claimed infringer, not to produce the patented 
product until the patent’s term expires, and (2) Company A, 
the patentee, to pay B many millions of dollars.2 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) maintains that this type of 
settlement violates antitrust laws because it “may lead to higher prices 
for pharmaceuticals by deterring generic entry, and contribute to 
increased health care costs that consumers, employers, and federal and 
state governments are struggling to contain.”3  A counterargument, 
 
* J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2008, Rutgers 
University.  Many thanks to my advisor, Professor David Opderbeck, for his guidance 
and advice.  My gratitude also goes to Professor Jordan Paradise and Professor C. Scott 
Hemphill for their invaluable suggestions.  I am grateful to Volumes 45 & 46 of the 
Seton Hall Law Review for their thoughtful edits and to my family, especially Daniel, and 
friends for their continued support. 
 1  21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(C) (2010). 
 2  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013).  
 3  Joshua D. Wright, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Remarks at the Concurrences 
Journal Annual Dinner: FTC v. Actavis and the Future of Reverse Payment Cases (Sept. 
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however, is that an owner of a valid patent is immune from antitrust 
violation because he or she has “the right to exclude others from 
making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout 
the United States.”4  Pharmaceutical companies in the United States 
are also free to set drug prices as they wish.5 
Lower courts have long disagreed as to the standard by which to 
analyze reverse payment settlement agreements for antitrust 
violations.6  The Actavis Court resolved the dispute by deciding that 
such agreements should be analyzed under the rule of reason,7 which 
generally requires a fact finder to “weigh[] all of the circumstances of 
a case in deciding whether a restrictive practice [e.g., a settlement] 
should be prohibited as imposing an unreasonable restraint on 
competition.”8  The Actavis decision has garnered much criticism for 
its inadequate guidance,9 because the Court “[left] to the lower courts 
the structuring of the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”10  One 
significant problem is that the Court did not rule out the possibility of 
“litigat[ing] patent validity to answer the antitrust question,”11 which 
defeats the purpose of settling patent infringement cases.  
Furthermore, the Court did not address whether the term “payment” 
encompasses non-monetary consideration.  Lower courts already 
 
26, 2013), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/ 
ftc-v.actavis-future-reverse-payment-cases/130926actavis.pdf. 
 4  35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2013).  
 5  Valerie Paris, Why Do Americans Spend So Much on Pharmaceuticals?, PBS 
NEWSHOUR (Feb. 7, 2014, 12:15 PM), http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/ 
americans-spend-much-pharmaceuticals/ (discussing that the United States has 
relatively low levels of price regulation of pharmaceuticals). 
 6  Compare, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms. Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012), with 
In re K–Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3d Cir. 2012).  Note that Actavis rejected the 
standards put forth by both circuits.   
 7  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2236. 
 8  Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) (quoting 
Cont’l T. V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49 (1977)).  
 9  See, e.g., Lars P. Taavola, Jumping into the Actavis Briar Patch—Insight into How 
Courts May Structure Reverse Payment Antitrust Proceedings and the Questions That Actavis 
Left Unanswered, 40 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1370 (2014); Kevin D. McDonald, Because I 
Said So: On the Competitive Rationale of FTC v. Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 36, 
http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/0d7aa5fb-4f61-49b8-807d-
e6ae4c967149/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/c363cc02-6322-42ba-a447-
ea9d6eafaf61/Fall13-McDonaldC.pdf; James J. O’Connell, Editor’s Note: The Elephant 
Remains, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 5, https://www.cov.com/~/media/files/corporate/ 
publications/2013/11/the_elephant_remains.pdf. 
 10  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238. 
 11  Id. at 2236. 
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disagree on this issue.12  Because of these ambiguities, pharmaceutical 
companies struggle to structure their settlement agreements to avoid 
antitrust scrutiny. 
For private parties who wish to bring an antitrust action against 
settled parties, an initial challenge lies in the identification of 
settlement agreements—if they are even publicly available.13  Since 
about 2004, pharmaceutical settlements have evolved to include a 
complex mix of side deals as well as non-monetary considerations.14  
Private parties must parse various transactions to determine whether 
any of them are related to the potentially anticompetitive agreement.  
Moreover, many private consumers are precluded from seeking 
remedies under the federal or state antitrust statutes even if they have 
been injured by overpriced drugs.15  The situation calls for drastic 
measures to remedy these problems. 
This Comment proposes that Congress adopt a mandatory 
judicial approval procedure for settling Hatch-Waxman litigations.  
The procedure is modeled after the process of settling class actions 
pursuant to the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e).  Part II explains 
the relevant background information, including the regulatory and 
legal developments as well as some of the existing problems associated 
with Hatch-Waxman disputes.  Part III describes the proposed 
procedure in detail and explains why the proposed settlement 
procedure is superior to the current settlement method.  Part IV then 
concludes by summarizing the proposed procedure and its benefits. 
 
 
 12  Compare, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 192 (D.R.I. 
2014) (“Reading Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to 
monetary settlements.”), with In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 
3d 231, 262 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[U]nlawful reverse payments are not limited to 
monetary payments.”).   
 13  The FTC and the Department of Justice have access to pharmaceutical 
settlement agreements, but private parties do not.  See Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 1112, 117 Stat. 
2066, 2461 (2003) [hereinafter MMA]. 
 14  C. Scott Hemphill, An Aggregate Approach to Antitrust: Using New Data and 
Rulemaking to Preserve Drug Competition, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 649 (2009); BUREAU OF 
COMPETITION, FED. TRADE COMM’N, AGREEMENTS FILED WITH THE FEDERAL TRADE 
COMMISSION UNDER THE MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG, IMPROVEMENT, AND 
MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2003: OVERVIEW OF AGREEMENTS FILED IN FY 2012 (2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-
trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-
and/130117mmareport.pdf. 
 15  See infra footnotes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
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II. RELEVANT LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND ISSUES IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
This Comment can be better understood if the reader is familiar 
with the legal and economic concerns surrounding the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Subsection A discusses the relationship 
between the patent system and the pharmaceutical industry.  
Subsection B describes the purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its 
pertinent provisions.  Subsection C explains the antirust enforcement 
mechanism and relevant issues.  Subsection D summarizes the circuit 
split that led to the Actavis decision, the Actavis opinion itself, and its 
aftermath. 
A. The Role of the Patent System in the Pharmaceutical Industry16 
In order to sustain their businesses, brand-name companies17 must 
recover their investments in drug development.  An estimate shows 
that “for every 5,000 to 10,000 compounds that enter the discovery 
pipeline, only five make it to clinical trials, and only one receives 
approval” from the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).18  The 
development of a single new drug takes an average of ten to fifteen 
years, and the research and development (R&D) investment per drug 
can be anywhere from $1.2 billion19 to $5 billion.20  These high figures 
are in part due to a high rate of failure—one commentator suggests 
that 95% of the experimental medicines fail to be both effective and 
 
 16  This Comment primarily focuses on exclusivity rights conferred by the patent 
system.  The Hatch-Waxman Act and other legislation provide non-patent exclusivity 
rights for certain new drug applicants.  See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(ii)–(iii), 
355(j)(5)(F)(ii)–(iv), 355a, 360cc (2010). 
 17  For the sake of simplicity, this Comment refers collectively to all companies that 
develop new drugs and file NDAs as “brand-name companies.”  In reality, many 
companies make both new and generic drugs. 
 18  PHARM. RESEARCH AND MFRS. OF AM., PHARM. INDUS. PROFILE 2012 30 (2012), 
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/phrma_industry_profile.pdf.   
 19  Id.  
 20  Matthew Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big 
Pharma to Change, FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013, 11:10 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewherper/2013/08/11/how-the-staggering-cost-
of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the-future-of-medicine/.  Note that there are:  
[s]ome caveats, though: drug companies have tax incentives to count 
costs in research and development, which could inflate the figure; they 
also are likely to spend extra money in order to get those medicines 
approved in other countries.  Even more important is the fact that some 
R&D costs come from monitoring the safety of medicines after they 
become hits to monitor reports of side effects.   
Id.   
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safe for human use.21  Even if drugs reach the market, only 20% of FDA-
approved drugs will recoup the cost of R&D.22  Furthermore, brand-
name companies suffer a dramatic loss in profits when generic 
products enter the market; competition causes the price of a patented 
drug to plummet, and within a year of generic entry, an average 
generic product “takes over ninety percent of the patent holder’s unit 
sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of the name brand 
product.”23 
A successful, patent-protected drug is vital for innovators’ 
financial futures and their ability to reinvest in research endeavors.  
The purpose of the United States patent system—“[t]o promote the 
[p]rogress of [s]cience and useful [a]rts, by securing for limited 
[t]imes to . . . [i]nventors the exclusive [r]ight to their 
[inventions]”24—is especially true for pharmaceutical innovations, as 
“new product development in the pharmaceutical industry is more 
dependent on patent protection than in many other industries.”25  One 
study shows “that 60 percent of inventions within the pharmaceutical 
industry would not have been” possible without the patent system.26 
Insofar as brand-name companies are dependent on the patent 
system to recover their R&D investments, there are indications that the 
companies have gone too far.  One strategy frequently employed by 
brand-name companies is to obtain “secondary” patents, i.e., patents 
protecting ancillary aspects of a drug other than its active ingredient.27  
These secondary patents essentially extend the overall period of patent 
protection for a particular drug, but they vary in strength.  In fact, 
many secondary patents are considered “weak,” meaning that they are 
 
 21  Id. 
 22  Intellectual Property Protections are Vital to Continuing Innovation in the 
Biopharmaceutical Industry, PHRMA, http://www.phrma.org/innovation/intellectual-
property (last visited Nov. 4, 2014) (“[O]nly 2 out of every 10 medicines will recoup 
the money spent on their development.”).  
 23  In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing FED. TRADE 
COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 
(2010), http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-how-
drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-
study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf).  
 24  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
 25  Brief of Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. (PHRMA) as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Respondents at 7, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 
WL 769196, at *7. 
 26  Id.  
 27  C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven N. Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, SCI., 
Mar. 2013, at 1386. 
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likely invalid or not infringed.28  The holder of a weak patent likely has 
no right to block the sale of cheaper alternatives to its brand-name 
drug.29  Thus, a settlement agreement that operates to exclude 
competitors from the market is likely anticompetitive when it ends a 
dispute over a weak patent.  On the other hand, even if a settlement 
excludes competition, it can be deemed pro-competitive if it allows 
generic entry before the expiration of the patent, especially if the 
patent is strong.30  In fact, the Actavis Court conceded that settlements 
with terms permitting the generic company to enter the market before 
the expiration of the patent “would . . . bring about competition . . . to 
the consumer’s benefit.”31  This is because market entry by generic 
companies and the resulting decrease in drug prices occur much 
sooner than they would without such arrangement; all it takes is a 
single strong patent for a brand-name company to completely 
dominate the market. 
B. The Hatch-Waxman Act 
Congress enacted the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act of 1984, commonly known as the Hatch-Waxman Act,32 
to “strike a balance between two conflicting policy objectives: to induce 
name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments necessary 
to research and develop new drug products, while simultaneously 
enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies of those drugs 
to market.”33  Prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 
FDA required brand-name and generic companies alike to submit 
proof of drug safety and efficacy through a New Drug Application 
(NDA).34  Brand-name companies were frustrated with the time-
 
 28  See, e.g., id.; see also Allison A. Schmitt, Note, Competition Ahead? The Legal 
Landscape for Reverse Payment Settlements After Federal Trade Commission v. Actavis, Inc., 
29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 493, 503 (2014) (noting that brand-name companies lose most 
litigations on secondary patents). 
 29  See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013). 
 30  Id. at 2237.   
 31  Id. at 2234.  
 32  Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 15, 21, 35, and 42 U.S.C.).   
 33  Mylan Pharms., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)); see also Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman Amendments): 
Statement Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of 
Daniel E. Troy, Chief Counsel, FDA), http://www.fda.gov/newsevents/testimony/ 
ucm115033.htm.  
 34  21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2010); Barbara J. Williams, A Prescription for Anxiety:  An 
Analysis of Three Brand-Name Drug Companies and Delayed Generic Drug Market Entry, 40 
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consuming FDA approval process: the longer the process took, the 
shorter their remaining patent terms became,35 and the more money 
they lost to generic competition.36  Generic companies were also held 
back by the pre-Hatch-Waxman requirement to “re-prove” data that 
had already been established by brand-name companies.37  
Furthermore, generic drug companies could not perform any tests on 
a patented drug until after the relevant patent(s) expired, because 
such use could be deemed an act of infringement.38  These 
impediments delayed generic entry and prolonged consumers’ 
burden. 
The Hatch-Waxman Act addressed these problems in various 
ways.  First, it provided patent term extension for patents covering a 
new drug product subject to FDA regulatory delays.39  Second, the Act 
also freed generic manufacturers from patent infringement liability 
arising from activities in connection with development of generic 
drugs.40  Third, it simplified the application process for generic 
manufacturers by allowing the submission of an Abbreviated New Drug 
Application (ANDA).41 
An ANDA obviates the need for generic companies to obtain all 
the necessary data from scratch.  It relies on the scientific findings of 
the corresponding NDA to demonstrate the safety and efficacy of a 
 
NEW ENG. L. REV. 1, 2 (2005). 
 35  During the pre-Hatch-Waxman era, a patent term was the greater of twenty 
years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United 
States, or seventeen years from the patent grant.  See  MPEP § 2701 (9th ed. Nov. 2015).   
 36  The FDA approval process normally takes place after patent acquisition.  
Williams, supra note 34, at 3 n.9 (citing FED. TRADE COMM’N, GENERIC DRUG ENTRY 
PRIOR TO PATENT EXPIRATION:  AN FTC STUDY 4 (2002) (“[T]he effective terms of many 
patents were shortened due to the time required for the FDA to ensure the safety and 
efficacy of the brand-name company’s drug product.”)).  
 37  Id. at 2 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 4 (1984), reprinted in 1984 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2686, 2688 (commenting on the state of the law before the enactment of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act that “with respect to drugs approved after 1962, the FDA has 
adopted the view that generics must virtually duplicate the same health and safety tests 
conducted by the original applicant for marketing approval”)). 
 38  See Roche Prods., Inc. v. Bolar Pharm. Co., 733 F.2d 858, 860–61 (Fed. Cir. 
1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 856 (1984) (holding that the district court erred when it 
concluded that the generic company’s use of the patented compound for commercial 
development purposes was not infringement even if it was necessary to obtain FDA 
approval), superseded by statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1). 
 39  35 U.S.C. § 156(a), (f)(1)(A), (f)(2)(A) (2011). 
 40  Id. § 271(e)(1) (“It shall not be an act of infringement to make, use, offer to 
sell, or sell . . . a patented invention . . . solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs . . . .”). 
 41  21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2010). 
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proposed generic drug as long as the generic company shows that its 
drug is bioequivalent to the brand-name drug in the NDA.42  An NDA 
filer, a brand-name company, may list any patents that it believes to 
cover its drug in the FDA’s compendium called Approved Drug 
Products with Therapeutic Equivalence Evaluations, commonly known 
as the “Orange Book.”43  A generic manufacturer seeking FDA approval 
must include in its ANDA one of the following certifications with 
respect to each patent listed in the Orange Book: no patent is listed in 
the Orange Book (Paragraph I); the patent has expired (Paragraph 
II); the ANDA filer will not sell the proposed generic drug until the 
Orange Book patent expires (Paragraph III); and the patent listed in 
the Orange Book is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, 
use, or sale of the generic company’s proposed drug (Paragraph IV).44  
A generic applicant must notify the brand-name company if its ANDA 
contains a Paragraph IV certification (“Paragraph IV ANDA”).45  Upon 
receipt of the notice, the brand-name company may do nothing, in 
which case the FDA may authorize the generic company to market its 
proposed product.46  Alternatively, the brand-name company may sue 
the generic manufacturer because the filing of a Paragraph IV ANDA 
itself is considered a statutory act of patent infringement.47  If the 
brand-name company sues within forty-five days of notice, the FDA may 
not grant final approval of the ANDA until the earlier of the passage 
of thirty months or the issuance of a court decision that the patent is 
invalid or not infringed.48  Thus, “the mere filing of an infringement . . . 
can provide additional years of a generic-free market, regardless of the 
merits of the lawsuit.”49  One commentator observed that at least twelve 
brand-name companies have actively used their secondary patents to 
trigger such thirty-month stay of FDA approval.50 
For the first Paragraph IV ANDA filer (“first-filer”), the Hatch-
Waxman Act grants a 180-day exclusivity period, during which other 
 
 42  Id. 
 43  § 355(b)(1)(G).  Eligible patents issued after the FDA approves an NDA may be 
listed in the Orange Book if the manufacturer files the patent information within thirty 
days of issuance.  § 355(c)(2). 
 44  § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 45  § 355(j)(2)(B).  
 46  § 355(j)(5)(B). 
 47  35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1)–(2).   
 48  § 355(j)(5)(B). 
 49  Elizabeth Powell-Bullock, Gaming the Hatch-Waxman System: How Pioneer Drug 
Makers Exploit the Law to Maintain Monopoly Power in the Prescription Drug Market, 29 J. 
LEGIS. 21, 26–27 (2002).  
 50  Id. at 34. 
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generic companies cannot compete in the market.51  The drafters of 
the Hatch-Waxman Act may have envisioned this exclusivity period as 
a reward for the generic manufacturers who undertake the effort to 
invalidate weak patents.52  Ironically, this well-intended incentive has 
turned into a “‘bounty’ worth hundreds of millions of dollars for a 
major drug” due to its potential to keep the drug prices substantially 
high.53  Until 1998, the FDA required the first-filers to win the patent 
infringement lawsuit to retain their exclusivity.54  Since then, however, 
the FDA relaxed the requirement to allow the first-filers to retain 
exclusivity so long as they did not lose.55  This meant that settling a case 
did not affect the first-filer’s exclusivity right even if the merits of the 
case remained unresolved. 
From a brand-name company’s perspective, paying the first-filer 
to delay its market entry makes economic sense.  First, the first-filer’s 
victory leads to a substantial loss of profits, especially in a situation 
where the patent at issue is the only patent blocking competition.56  
Outcomes of drug patent infringement suits are notoriously 
unpredictable and error prone, with patents being invalidated “more 
than 70 percent of the time.”57  “This means that the strongest of 
patents has a substantial chance of losing after a trial and appeal, just 
as the weakest of patents has a substantial chance of winning.”58  
Furthermore, brand-name companies have little to gain from their 
own victories because they neither result in damages nor prevent other 
 
 51  § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).  If multiple applicants file on the same day, the FDA may 
designate more than one applicant as a “first-filer.”  CTR. FOR DRUG EVALUATION & 
RESEARCH, U.S. DEP’T. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY 
EXCLUSIVITY WHEN MULTIPLE ANDAS ARE SUBMITTED ON THE SAME DAY 5–6 (2003), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/drugs/guidancecomplianceregulatoryinformation/
guidances/ucm072851.pdf. 
 52  Schmitt, supra note 28, at 499 (citing Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. 
Owners Ass’n in Support of Respondents at 25, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 
(2013) (No. 12-416)).  
 53  C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical Patent Settlement as a Regulatory 
Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1560 (2006).  
 54  Hemphill, supra note 14, at 658.  
 55  Id. 
 56  Michael R. Herman, Note, The Stay Dilemma: Examining Brand and Generic 
Incentives for Delaying the Resolution of Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 
1788, 1800–01 (2011). 
 57  Rudolph J.R. Peritz, The Competition Question Unasked in Actavis: What is the Scope 
of the Patent Right to Exclude?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 45, 49, 
http://awa2014.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/fall13-peritzc.pdf.  
 58  Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n in Support of 
Respondents at 10, FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), 2013 WL 
871961, at *10. 
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generic companies from attempting to enter the market.59  Rather than 
putting their valuable patents in jeopardy and running the risk of 
incurring losses, many brand-name companies prefer to settle by 
sharing their monopoly profits with first-filers. 
More significantly, a settlement that delays a first-filer’s market 
entry creates a “bottleneck” period during which a brand-name 
company is able to engage in supracompetitive pricing of its drug.  This 
is because a first-filer’s 180-day exclusivity period begins to run only 
when the first-filer begins marketing its generic product, or a court 
renders a judgment of patent invalidity or non-infringement.60  Thus, 
subsequent ANDA filers cannot enter the market unless one of them 
obtains a favorable court judgment against the brand-name company.  
Brand-name companies avoid the risk of losing altogether by not suing 
subsequent Paragraph IV ANDA filers.61  The ANDA filers have little 
incentive to initiate a declaratory judgment action,62 because even the 
winner in such a lawsuit must wait for the first-filer’s exclusivity period 
to run its course, at which time other generics can enter the market 
and drive down the drug prices.63 
Congress attempted to rectify the bottleneck problem by adding 
a forfeiture provision64 as part of the Medicare Prescription Drug, 
Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA).65  The 
provision causes a first-filer to lose its exclusivity period when it fails to 
market its generic drug by the “later of” the two conditions defined in 
subsections (aa) and (bb) of the Act.66  Unfortunately, the problem of 
the bottleneck lingers after the MMA amendments because the new 
 
 59  See Herman, supra note 56, at 1800. 
 60  Hemphill, supra note 14, at 658.  
 61  Id. at 658–59. 
 62  21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(D) (2010) (establishing that generic drug applicant may 
file a declaratory judgment action if the NDA holder does not sue on all of the Orange 
Book listed patents within the forty-five-day period). 
 63  Hemphill, supra note 14, at 635. 
 64  § 355(j)(5)(D).  
 65  Pub. L. No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066 (2003) (codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C. and 21 U.S.C.). 
 66  The first condition under (aa) is “the earlier of” seventy-five days after the first 
filer’s approval is made effective or thirty months after the ANDA filing.  § 
355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(aa).  The second condition under (bb) is seventy-five days after: a 
court decision, from which no appeal has been taken or can be taken, that the patent 
is invalid or not infringed; a settlement states that the patent is invalid or not infringed; 
the patent information for the listed drug is withdrawn by the NDA holder; or the first 
ANDA filer amends or withdraws the Paragraph IV certification.  § 355(j)(5)(D)(i) 
(I)(bb), (q)(1)(G).  See also Hemphill, supra note 14, at 660–61.  
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rule still allows first-filers to retain their exclusivity by settling.67  
Furthermore, while the new rule continues to allow subsequent filers 
to trigger the 180-day exclusivity period by obtaining a court judgment, 
it now requires that the judgment come from an appeals court.68  Thus, 
incentives for subsequent filers to challenge patents are further 
diminished because even after expending their resources to win at the 
appellate level, the 180-day exclusivity remains with the first-filer.69  No 
subsequent ANDA filer is eligible for exclusivity upon the first-filer’s 
forfeiture.70 
Furthermore, the unique framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
created an inherent power imbalance between brand-name and 
generic companies.  This is because a Paragraph IV litigation occurs 
before the generic enters the market.71  Under such circumstance, 
“[t]he patent owner [i.e., the brand-name company] risks losing its 
patent, but the alleged infringer does not risk a damage award.”72  
From the generic’s perspective, the benefit of winning a lawsuit and 
gaining entry to a lucrative market far outweighs the cost of litigation, 
and thus justifies a challenge to the patent even with a 1.3% chance of 
success.73  The power imbalance may also affect settlement 
 
 67  According to the FDA, as long as there is a possibility that at least one of the 
conditions in subsection (bb) could still occur, the first-filer would not forfeit its 
exclusivity.  Letter from Gary J. Buehler, Dir., Office of Generic Drugs, Food & Drug 
Admin., to Marc A. Goshko, Exec. Dir., Teva N. Am. 5 (Jan. 17, 2008), 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsar
eDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/AbbreviatedNewDrugApplicationA
NDAGenerics/UCM151237.pdf [hereinafter FDA Letter]; see also Kurt R. Karst, 
Academics Criticize the MMA’s Failure-to-Market Forfeiture Provisions as an Anemic Mechanism 
for Parked Exclusivity and the MMA’s DJ Provisions as a Paper Tiger, FDA LAW BLOG (Apr. 
27, 2011), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_phelps/2011/04/ 
academics-criticize-the-mmas-failure-to-market-forfeiture-provisions-as-an-anemic-
mechanism-for-park.html (explaining that the current statute does not counteract the 
problem of exclusivity “parking” by first ANDA filers). 
 68  § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I)(bb); see also Hemphill, supra note 14, at 661 (“The post-
MMA rules make the relevant condition for defeasement an appeals court win, rather 
than a district court win—a condition now applicable to both post-MMA and pre-MMA 
drugs.”). 
 69  Hemphill, supra note 53, at 1586 (noting that settling with a first-filer “removes 
from consideration the most motivated challenger, and the one closest to introducing 
competition”).  
 70  § 355(j)(5)(D)(iii); see also Hemphill, supra note 53, at 1583–84. 
 71  § 355(j)(2)(B). 
 72  David W. Opderbeck, Rational Antitrust Policy and Reverse Payment Settlements in 
Hatch-Waxman Patent Litigation, 98 GEO. L.J. 1303, 1307 (2010).  
 73  Brief of Amicus Curiae Intellectual Prop. Owners Ass’n in Support of 
Respondents, supra note 58, at 24 (“[F]or more than 90% of branded drug sales 
(measured in dollars), a generic challenger balancing upside gain under Hatch-
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negotiations.  The generic company, knowing that it has little to lose 
by litigating, may demand a high settlement amount, and the brand-
name company would pay that amount as long as it does not exceed 
the brand-name company’s expected payout from winning the 
lawsuit.74  According to one study, brand-name companies can pay 
generic manufacturers between $1.75 million and $132.5 million for a 
delay period of between four months and ten years.75  As explained 
below, Actavis provides slight leverage in negotiations for brand-name 
companies because “unexplained” and “large” reverse payments raise 
red flags, but the basic power balance has not changed. 
C. Antitrust Enforcement 
Even after a settlement is reached, the brand-name and generic 
companies do not live happily ever after.  Under the current antitrust 
enforcement mechanism, parties who have settled a Paragraph IV 
litigation could face multiple lawsuits instituted by outside parties.  The 
enforcement system is decentralized in the United States, and thus, 
potential antitrust plaintiffs include the federal government, state 
governments, and aggrieved individuals and entities.  A federal 
antitrust action may be brought under two federal statutes: the 
Sherman Act76 and the Clayton Act.77  The FTC78 may initiate an 
antitrust action under the Sherman Act against parties for collusion (§ 
 
Waxman against downside risk limited to litigation costs can justify the challenge if it 
believes it has at least a 1.3% chance of success.”).  
 74  Amanda P. Reeves, Muddying the Settlement Waters: Open Questions and Unintended 
Consequences Following FTC v. Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 9, 12. 
 75  John Fazzio, Pharmaceutical Patent Settlements: Fault Lines at the Intersection of 
Intellectual Property & Antitrust Law Require a Return to the Rule of Reason, 11 J. TECH. L. & 
POL’Y 1, 14 (2006). 
 76  Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2012)). 
 77  Clayton Antitrust Act, Pub. L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 
§§ 12–27 (2012); 29 U.S.C. §§ 52–53 (2012)).  This Comment assumes that the 
interstate commerce requirement of the federal statutes is satisfied.  
 78  The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and the FTC share the 
responsibility of enforcing federal antitrust laws, but only the Antitrust Division may 
institute criminal proceedings.  15 U.S.C. §§ 41–58 (2012).  Criminal prosecutions, 
however, are relatively rare in the Hatch-Waxman context because “criminal 
prosecution in general and imprisonment in particular have been confined to 
instances of outrageous conduct of undoubted illegality.”  Molly Wilcox & Jason Yan, 
Antitrust Violations, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 837, 838 n.8 (2014) (quoting 2 PHILLIP E. 
AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTIRUST LAW § 303b (3d ed. 2006)).  Hatch-Waxman 
settlements do not normally fall within the category of “undoubted illegality” because 
the issue of patent validity/infringement creates uncertainty as to the legality of the 
settlements.   
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1)79 or against a single party for engaging in a monopoly (§ 2).80  15 
U.S.C. § 15c also allows state attorneys general to bring civil actions as 
parens patriae on behalf of natural persons who have been injured as a 
result of a violation of the Sherman Act.81  The Clayton Act authorizes 
private individuals who have been injured “by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws” to sue and recover threefold the 
damages, as well as the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney’s fee.82 
Under federal law, a civil antitrust suit must be commenced within 
four years of accrual.83  “An antitrust cause of action accrues . . . when 
a defendant commits an act[] that causes injury to the plaintiff.”84  In 
the Hatch-Waxman context, this means that the statute of limitations 
begins to run when settling parties enter into an allegedly unlawful 
agreement.  The statute of limitations, however, is not rigid.  In class 
action lawsuits (which is often the case for private antitrust actions 
against parties to Paragraph IV settlements), “the filing of a class action 
tolls the statute of limitations as to all asserted members of the class.”85  
The statute of limitations remains tolled for all members of the 
putative class until class certification is denied.  Potential class 
members “may choose to file their own suits or to intervene as plaintiffs 
in the pending action.”86  Therefore, parties to Paragraph IV 
settlements may face antitrust lawsuits from both the FTC and private 
parties more than four years after the agreement date. 
The settling parties could also face state antitrust actions more 
than four years after they settle.  Nearly all states have antitrust laws 
that typically authorize the state attorneys general to bring criminal or 
civil actions against antitrust offenders,87 and many state laws provide 
remedies for private plaintiffs.88  State statutes of limitations vary, but 
some states hold that the limitations period begins when the plaintiff 
 
 79  15 U.S.C. § 1 (2011). 
 80  Id. § 2.  
 81  Id. § 15c.  
 82  Id. § 15a.  This right of action is generally limited to direct purchasers of price-
fixed items, i.e., persons or entities who directly purchase from the antitrust violator.  
See also notes 91–98 and accompanying text. 
 83  Id. § 15b. 
 84  In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 218 
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, 401 U.S. 321, 338 
(1971)).  
 85  In re Ciprofloxacin, 261 F. Supp. 2d at 219 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 86  Crown, Cork & Seal Co., Inc. v. Parker, 462 U.S. 345, 354 (1983).  
 87  Wilcox et al., supra note 78, at 869. 
 88  Kurtis A. Kemper, Right of Retail Buyer of Price-Fixed Product to Sue Manufacturer on 
State Antitrust Claim, 35 A.L.R. 6TH 245, pt. II.B.§ 9 (2008). 
SEIDEL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  1:50 PM 
710 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:361 
 
discovers the anticompetitive act as opposed to when the defendants 
settle.  For example, in Rhode Island, the plaintiff must commence an 
action “within four (4) years after the plaintiff discovered, or by the 
exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts 
relied upon for proof of the conspiracy.”89 
For many injured parties (such as consumers who bought 
overpriced drugs), one significant hurdle is antitrust standing.  
Paragraph IV settlements affect people’s right to healthcare,90 yet not 
every injured person is entitled to recovery even when the federal and 
state statutes provide private causes of action.91  Specifically, the 
indirect purchaser rule limits recovery only to direct purchasers, i.e., 
persons or entities who purchased price-fixed items directly from the 
antitrust violator.92  This rule applies to the federal statutes93 as well as 
many state statutes that do not specifically repeal the indirect 
purchaser rule.94  In the pharmaceutical context, indirect purchasers 
(e.g., consumers) are precluded from bringing an antitrust action 
against those companies that caused delayed generic entry by way of a 
settlement agreement.95  Thus, indirect purchasers of pharmaceutical 
 
 89  R.I. Gen. Laws § 6-36-23 (2014); see also N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:9-14 (West 2014) 
(“Any action brought to enforce the provisions of this act shall be barred unless 
commenced within 4 years after the cause of action arose . . . .”).   
 90  See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. H12,623, H12,848 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement 
of Rep. Braley) (“[T]his bill will do for America what we should have done 100 years 
ago: provide health care for all Americans as a matter of right, not as a matter of 
privilege.”); 155 CONG. REC. H12,598, H12,619 (daily ed. Nov. 7, 2009) (statement of 
Rep. Langevin) (“Every American deserves the promise of quality affordable health 
care, and this is our moment to fulfill that promise.”).  This Comment refrains from 
discussing the issue of whether illegal immigrants have the right to healthcare.  
 91  For example, Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides a private right of action, 
authorizing a person injured “by reason of” an allegedly anticompetitive act to sue and 
recover threefold the damages, as well as the cost of suit and a reasonable attorney’s 
fee.  See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2011).  Many state laws also provide similar remedies for private 
plaintiffs.  See Kemper, supra note 88, at pt. II.B.§ 9. 
 92  See generally Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).  See also Kemper, 
supra note 88, at pt. I.§ 2 (explaining that the indirect purchaser rule “generally bars 
actions by retail buyers against manufacturers of price-fixed products, subject to 
limited exceptions”). 
 93  See, e.g., In re Terazosin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 160 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 
1369 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (“The U.S. Supreme Court has flatly repudiated such efforts to 
trace damages through multiple levels in a chain of distribution or to apportion 
damages between direct and indirect purchasers.”).  
 94  See, e.g., In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 409 
(D. Mass. 2013) (“[E]nd-payors cannot assert antitrust claims under the law of states 
which have not passed [repealer statutes which specifically grant end-payors the right 
to sue for antitrust violations].”). 
 95  Some exceptions apply.  For example, in In re Relafen Antitrust Litigation, 346 F. 
Supp. 2d 349, 368, 370 (D. Mass. 2004), retail drug store plaintiffs were allowed 
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drugs often have no practical avenue to recover damages for overpaid 
drug products.  Even in the states that recently enacted the so-called 
“repealer” statutes of the indirect purchaser rule (also called “Illinois 
Brick repealers”), the statutes often apply prospectively.96  Indirect 
purchasers in such jurisdictions cannot recover for the overcharges 
that took place before the enactment of the repealer statutes.  In 
recent years, indirect purchasers have attempted to circumvent this 
rule by making claims under the state consumer protection statutes 
and unjust enrichment laws, but their attempts have typically been 
unsuccessful.  For instance, consumer protection statutes have 
requirements that cannot be easily satisfied since they apply only to 
courses of conduct that are deceptive and fraudulent as opposed to 
merely anticompetitive.97  Many courts have also dismissed unjust 
enrichment claims brought under state laws because they would 
otherwise constitute “end-runs” around state antitrust laws and 
consumer-protection statutes.98 
Even in states that permit indirect purchasers to bring an antitrust 
claim, there is the fundamental problem of accessing private 
settlement agreements.  This problem also plagues direct purchasers.  
As time passes, it would become an increasingly daunting task for 
anyone to identify any side deals related to the settlement.  In In re 
Lipitor, for example, it was not until after limited discovery that all 
relevant side agreements were revealed: multiple litigations 
concerning two other drugs in the United States—Accupril and 
Caduet—as well as twenty-three legal proceedings in thirteen foreign 
countries.99  In light of Actavis, settlements of Paragraph IV lawsuits will 
likely become more complex to avoid an appearance of a large, 
unexplained reverse payment.100  Individuals who were involved in 
 
recovery for their federal claims even though they were indirect purchasers because 
they had been expressly assigned the rights of direct purchasers that had opted out of 
the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ class. 
 96  In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 759 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (“[T]he 
end-payor plaintiffs may not recover for any overcharges incurred before the Oregon 
and Rhode Island repealer statutes took effect.”).  
 97  See, e.g., id.  The case was an antitrust suit in connection with a reverse payment 
settlement.  Claims brought under the consumer protection statutes of Minnesota, 
Pennsylvania, and Virginia were dismissed because no allegations of deceit were made.  
Id. at 760. 
 98  See, e.g., In re Terazosin, 160 F. Supp. 2d at 1380 (“State legislatures and courts 
that adopted the Illinois Brick rule against indirect purchaser antitrust suits did not 
intend to allow an end run around the policies allowing only direct purchasers to 
recover.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 99  In re Lipitor Antitrust Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 532–34  (D.N.J. 2014).  
 100  See Reeves, supra note 74, at 12 (“To eliminate as much risk [of antitrust lawsuit] 
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settlement negotiations may be unavailable by the time an injured 
party contemplates an antitrust action.  In some instances, settled 
parties voluntarily publish the terms of their settlement agreements.101  
Nevertheless, “publicly available information contains significant 
gaps”102 and may be insufficient for private parties to plead a cause of 
action that can survive a motion to dismiss, or to recognize an 
anticompetitive scheme to begin with. 
The problem is compounded when a brand-name company 
strategically enters into a series of settlement agreements with multiple 
ANDA filers.103  Such a scheme is difficult to identify and/or prove.  
Suppose a brand-name company has an extremely weak patent that is 
blocking competition in a lucrative market.  The brand-name company 
initiates a patent infringement action against the first-filer and then 
settles, requiring the first-filer to delay its market entry and to retain its 
180-day exclusivity.  This settlement blocks subsequent filers from 
entering the market until after the expiration of the agreed-upon delay 
period plus 180 days, unless one of the subsequent ANDA filers obtains 
an appellate court judgment that the patent is invalid or not 
infringed.104  Suppose further that a number of the subsequent filers 
decide to challenge the patent.  The brand-name company sues and 
then settles with each of them in order to prevent a court judgment of 
invalidity or non-infringement.  This series of settlements is 
anticompetitive because, as described above, a weak patent does not 
warrant its owner to exclude others from competition.105  Because of 
the complexities and confidential nature of these agreements, 
 
as possible, companies should . . . avoid structuring settlements that involve 
unexplained high dollar payments from the branded to the generic company . . . .”). 
 101  For example, in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 261 F. Supp. 
2d 188, 197 n.13 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), settled parties had made press releases regarding 
the settlement and its major terms.  Moreover, one of the parties submitted a redacted 
copy of the settlement agreement in a public SEC filing.  As another example, if a 
generic company challenges a patent before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 
information related to the proceeding becomes public. 
 102  Hemphill, supra note 14, at 647.  
 103  See, e.g., FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2229–30 (2013).  FTC filed a lawsuit 
against all settling parties alleging that Solvay, the patentee, colluded with both the 
first Paragraph IV filer, Actavis, and the subsequent filer, Paddock, to share in Solvay’s 
monopoly profits.  Id.  Solvay agreed to pay the two filers in exchange for delaying 
market entry.  Id. at 2229.   
 104  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D)(i)(I) (2010); Hemphill, supra note 14, at 658.  See also 
FDA Letter, supra note 67. 
 105  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (“[A]n invalidated patent carries with it no . . . right 
[to exclude others from competition].  And even a valid patent confers no right to 
exclude products or processes that do not actually infringe.”).   
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however, antitrust plaintiffs might not be able to identify and attack all 
such agreements.  Thus, a brand-name company might prevail on the 
individual actions, even if the settlement scheme as a whole is unlawful. 
Since settling parties in Hatch-Waxman lawsuits are required to 
submit their agreements to the FTC,106 one might argue that the FTC 
is better-positioned than private parties to bring actions on behalf of 
the injured members of the public who have no legal recourse.  In fact, 
after Actavis, the FTC has reaffirmed its plans to focus on pay for delay 
settlements.107  But government agencies have limited resources and 
cannot satisfy the interests of all individual purchasers.  Furthermore, 
the political climate could shift an agency’s focus and resources to 
another issue at any time.  Most significantly, the FTC cannot always be 
proactive in its approach to consumer protection.  Its enforcement 
actions often take place long after consumers have been injured. 
D. Actavis and Questions Left Unanswered 
i. FTC v. Actavis, Inc. 
Actavis revolved around agreements that a single brand-name 
company entered into with three generic companies to settle 
Paragraph IV litigations.  The agreements contained “roughly similar 
promises,” requiring each generic company to not enter the relevant 
market until sixty-five months before the brand-name company’s 
patent expired and to market the brand-name company’s product in 
return for the payment of “millions of dollars.”108  The FTC initiated an 
antitrust lawsuit against all parties for “unlawfully agreeing to share in 
[the brand-name company]’s monopoly profits, abandon their patent 
challenges, and refrain from launching [cheaper generic drugs] . . . 
for nine years.”109  As mentioned above, the dilemma in antitrust cases 
involving reverse payment settlement agreements stems from the 
unresolved issue of patent strength.  The pre-Actavis courts disagreed 
as to the antitrust standard for analyzing reverse payment settlements.  
Some circuits applied the “scope-of-the-patent” test, under which a 
 
 106  MMA, supra note 13. 
 107  See José P. Sierra, FTC Reveals Plans for Reverse Payment Hatch-Waxman Cases, 
PHARMARISC.COM (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.pharmarisc.com/2013/08/ftc-reveals-
plans-for-reverse-payment-hatch-waxman-cases/ (“Ending anti-competitive ‘pay-for-
delay’ settlements is a top priority at the Federal Trade Commission, according to FTC 
Chairwoman Edith Ramirez.”).  See also Wright, supra note 3 (interpreting the Actavis 
decision to be a “significant victory for the Commission”). 
 108  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2229. 
 109  Id. at 2229–30 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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reverse payment settlement was immune from antitrust scrutiny so 
long as the anticompetitive effects fell within the “exclusionary 
potential” of the patent.110  Other courts employed the “quick-look” 
approach, which viewed reverse payment settlements as prima facie 
evidence of illegality.111 
The Actavis Court resolved the circuit split by holding that courts 
should employ the rule of reason approach112 to strike a balance 
“between the lawful restraint on trade of the patent monopoly and the 
illegal restraint prohibited broadly by the Sherman Act.”113  In 
connection with the rule of reason analysis, the Court suggested that 
“the size of the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable 
surrogate for a patent’s weakness,”114 which in turn reveals “the 
payment’s objective . . . to maintain supracompetitive prices to be 
shared among the patentee and the challenger.”115  The Court further 
stated that the size of a reverse payment may serve as “a strong 
indicator of power” possessed by the patentee to bring about 
anticompetitive harm.116  The Court rejected the “scope-of-the-patent” 
analysis because “whether a particular restraint lies beyond the limits 
of the patent monopoly is a conclusion . . . and not . . . its starting 
point.”117  The Court pointed out that the “scope-of-the-patent” test 
overlooks the possibility of the patentee’s “serious doubts about the 
patent’s survival” and objective of the payment “to maintain 
supracompetitive prices.”118  In rejecting the “quick look” approach, 
the Court held that some reverse payments can be justified under 
antitrust analysis.119 
 
 
 
 110  See, e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1309 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 111  See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 112  The rule of reason analysis, in general, examines “whether the restraint 
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or 
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition.”  Bd. of Trade v. United 
States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). 
 113  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2231 (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 114  Id. at 2236–37. 
 115  Id. at 2236. 
 116  Id. 
 117  Id. at 2231–32 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 118  Id. at 2235, 2236–37. 
 119  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2237. 
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ii. The Aftermath of Actavis 
While Actavis resolved the circuit split, it left more questions than 
answers because the Court left “to the lower courts the structuring of 
the present rule-of-reason antitrust litigation.”120  One unresolved issue 
in the aftermath of Actavis is the precise definition of the term 
“payment.”  There are currently various ways to settle Hatch-Waxman 
disputes other than what was at issue in Actavis.  For example, 
settlements can take the form of a licensing agreement without any 
money exchanging hands where the brand-name company allows the 
generic manufacturer to use its patent.121  Since the issuance of the 
Actavis opinion in June 2013, lower courts have already disagreed on 
what constitutes “payment.”  Some judges have held that the Actavis 
decision applies to monetary payments only, while others concluded 
that payment is not so limited.122  The FTC agrees with the latter view, 
noting that a brand-name company’s promise not to develop or market 
its authorized generic (AG)123 is a form of payment.124 
Furthermore, the Actavis Court did not define what constitutes a 
“large” payment.  The Court only suggested that “strong evidence” of 
anticompetitive activity may be found when the amount of payment is 
 
 120  Id. at 2238.  See In re Aggrenox Antitrust Litig., 94 F. Supp. 3d 224, 235 (D. Conn. 
2015) (“Several district courts have already applied Actavis, with not entirely consistent 
results.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 121  Fazzio, supra note 75, at 13–14. 
 122  Compare, e.g., In re Loestrin 24 FE Antitrust Litig., 45 F. Supp. 3d 180, 192 (D.R.I. 
2014) (“Reading Actavis, this Court cannot help but find that it applies solely to 
monetary settlements . . . .”), with King Drug Co. of Florence v. SmithKline Beecham 
Corp., 791 F.3d 388, 403 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We do not believe Actavis’s holding can be 
limited to reverse payments of cash.”), In re Nexium Esomeprazole Antitrust Litig., 42 
F. Supp. 3d 231, 262 (D. Mass. 2014) (“[U]nlawful reverse payments are not limited to 
monetary payments.”) (internal quotation marks omitted), In re Lipitor Antitrust 
Litig., 46 F. Supp. 3d 523, 543 (D.N.J. 2014) (“In applying Actavis here, the non-
monetary payment must be converted to a reliable estimate of its monetary 
value . . . .”), and In re Niaspan Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 735, 751 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(“‘[R]everse payment’ is not limited to a cash payment.”). 
 123  An AG is a generic drug produced by the same brand-name company that issues 
the corresponding brand-name drug.  Brand-name companies can market AGs even 
during the first-filer’s exclusivity period.  See, e.g., Alix McKenna, FTC Report Shows 
Increase in Pay-for-Delay Drug Settlements, REGBLOG (June 11, 2013), 
http://www.regblog.org/2013/06/11/11-mckenna-ftc-report/.   
 124  Brief of Fed. Trade Comm’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Plaintiffs-
Appellants at 16–18, King Drug Co. of Florence v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 791 F.3d 
388 (3d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-1243), 2014 WL 1745072, at *16–18 (urging the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Third Circuit to reverse the district court’s determination that a 
brand-name company’s commitment not to introduce an authorized generic in 
exchange for a generic company’s promise to drop a challenge to the patent was not 
a “reverse-payment” under Actavis).  
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larger than what the generic drug would gain in profits if it won the 
Paragraph IV litigation and entered the market.125  At the same time, 
the Court cautioned that a finding of large reverse payment alone is 
insufficient to conclude illegality because certain reverse payments can 
have lawful explanations, such as the cost of anticipated litigation, 
payments for valuable services promised to be rendered by the generic 
company, or “any other convincing justification.”126 
Yet another uncertainty arising from Actavis is when and how the 
question of patent validity and/or infringement should be considered.  
According to the Court, “it is normally not necessary to litigate patent 
validity to answer the antitrust question,”127 and the legal community is 
largely in agreement that the Actavis Court did not wish to entirely 
disregard the merits of a settled case.128  A challenge lies in defining 
the conditions under which the issue of patent validity and 
infringement must be addressed.  Furthermore, in cases where the 
merits of underlying litigation may not be considered, it is 
questionable whether antitrust principles alone are sufficient to assess 
the anticompetitive effects of Paragraph IV settlements.  As one 
commentator points out, “the problem is that the ultimate competitive 
impact of a pharmaceutical patent settlement is really dependent on 
the merits of the underlying patent litigation.”129 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 125  Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2235 (citing Hemphill, supra note 53, at 1581).  
 126  Id. at 2237. 
 127  Id. at 2236 (emphasis added). 
 128  See, e.g., FTC v. Cephalon, Inc., 36 F. Supp. 3d 527, 531–32 (E.D. Pa. 2014) 
(“[I]n my view, the use of the word ‘normally’ reflects the Court’s expression that 
under certain discrete circumstances there could be situations where the validity of 
the patent should be litigated within a reverse payment antitrust trial.”); Taavola, supra 
note 9, at 1406 (“[T]he rule-of-reason approach may encourage the parties, at least in 
part, to argue the merits of the underlying case.”).  See also Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2238 
(suggesting that courts structure litigation to avoid both “the use of antitrust theories 
too abbreviated to permit proper analysis, and . . . consideration of every possible fact 
or theory”).  
 129  McDonald, supra note 9, at 38 (quoting Thomas B. Leary, Comm’r, Fed. Trade 
Comm’n, Address Before the Am. Bar Ass’n Antitrust Healthcare Program: Antitrust 
Issues in the Settlement of Pharmaceutical Patent Disputes, Pt. II (May 17, 2001), 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2001/05/antitrust-issues-settlement-
pharmaceutical-patent-disputes-part-ii#N_6_).  
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III. DETAILS AND ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL APPROVAL 
PROCEDURE 
Bearing in mind the intricate interrelationships among the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, antitrust laws, and the public interests, this 
Comment suggests that Congress implement a mandatory procedure 
to judicially approve settlement agreements (“proposed procedure” or 
“proposed settlement procedure”) that alleviates many of the 
problems associated with settling Paragraph IV litigations and similar 
proceedings.130  The procedure mirrors the framework of Rule 23(e) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires judicial 
approval of any “settlement, voluntary dismissal, or compromise of the 
claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class” in a class action.131 
Perhaps the initial reaction to applying Rule 23(e) in this context 
may be that Paragraph IV litigations are not class actions.  When parties 
to a Paragraph IV litigation settle, non-parties (e.g., members of the 
public) will not be legally bound by the settlement terms in the same 
way that class members would be bound in a class action settlement.  
While this is true and could be a potential limitation to applying Rule 
23(e), common law sometimes calls for judicial review and approval, 
particularly if a settlement “affects the rights of non-parties or non-
settling parties, or where the settlement is executed by a party acting 
in a representative capacity.”132 
Addressing the second condition first, one could argue that 
Paragraph IV filers act for the benefit of the public by virtue of 
challenging unwarranted patents.133  In case of Paragraph IV litigations 
involving weak patents, it is overwhelmingly pro-competitive and 
beneficial to the public when a Paragraph IV filer prevails.  But 
Paragraph IV filers fall short of playing the “representative” role on 
behalf of the public: the interests of Paragraph IV filers and the public 
do not align, because the ultimate goal of Paragraph IV filers in 
 
 130  The proposed procedure focuses on the settlements of actions that were 
initiated within forty-five days of Paragraph IV notice.  The same model, however, may 
apply to settlements of other types of actions.  For example, brand-name companies 
may strategically choose to initiate a lawsuit based on Paragraph IV filings after the 
expiration of forty-five days or wait for the Paragraph IV filer to file a declaratory 
judgment action against them.  The same anticompetitive concerns discussed in this 
Comment would apply to settlements of such actions because they can involve a 
payment, delayed generic entry, and retention of the 180-day exclusivity period. 
 131  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e). 
 132  MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 13.14 at 172 (2004) [hereinafter 
MANUAL]. 
 133  Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1338.  
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litigation is not necessarily “victory,” i.e., invalidating the patent or 
finding a non-infringement.134  When a Paragraph IV filer prevails in 
litigation and enters the market, it is often true that “the total profits of 
the patent holder and the generic manufacturer on the drug in the 
competitive market will be lower than the total profits of the patent 
holder alone under a patent-conferred monopoly.”135  Therefore, it 
makes economic sense for a Paragraph IV filer to settle by delaying its 
market entry and reap the benefit of the resulting monopoly of the 
patent holder as long as the value of the filer’s share exceeds the 
anticipated gain from litigious victory.  A Paragraph IV filer certainly is 
not acting in a “representative capacity” when it settles an action 
involving a weak patent because the public is denied access to generic 
drugs.  Furthermore, the existence of a weak patent influences drug 
availability to the public in the future because a bad patent often causes 
other companies to forgo R&D in the field it improperly covers.136  
Reduced participation in R&D hampers innovation and results in 
fewer treatment options for patients. 
The first condition—settlements affecting the rights of non-
parties or non-settling parties—better describes Paragraph IV 
settlements because the Hatch-Waxman procedural framework 
facilitates “litigation specifically intended to benefit parties beyond 
those named in the action.”137  The purpose of Rule 23(e) is to “assure 
that any person whose rights would be affected by a dismissal or 
compromise has the opportunity to contest the proposed action.”138  
Similarly, the outcome of a Paragraph IV litigation affects accessibility 
of drugs for patients who have the right to healthcare.139  Today, 
patients on at least one prescription drug make up anywhere from 50% 
 
 134  Robert E. Colletti, The Role of the Food and Drug Attorney in Hatch-Waxman 
Lawsuits, Food and Drug Settlements and Negotiations, in INSIDE THE MINDS: FOOD AND DRUG 
SETTLEMENTS AND NEGOTIATIONS (2006) (discussing various ways in which generic 
companies benefit from filing an ANDA regardless of first-to-file status).  
 135  In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 209 (2d Cir. 2006), 
abrogated on other grounds by FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).   
 136  FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF 
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1, 5 (2003), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/promote-innovation-
proper-balance-competition-and-patent-law-and-policy/innovationrpt.pdf. 
 137  Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1338.  
 138  Pearson v. Skydell, 522 F.2d 171, 176–77 (5th Cir. 1975) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), reh’g denied, 525 F.2d 1407 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 912 
(1976); see also Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426, 428 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“The purpose of requiring Court approval of a ‘dismissal’ or 
‘compromise’ of a class action is to protect the interests of non-party class members.”). 
 139  See supra note 90. 
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to 70% of the population.140  The FTC estimates that pay for delay 
settlements add $35 billion to consumers’ out-of-pocket expenses and 
$12 billion or more to the federal government over a ten year period.141  
In 2013, 21% of adults in the United States discontinued or skipped 
prescription doses because of high cost.142 
Furthermore, the current regulatory climate does not necessarily 
“induce name-brand pharmaceutical firms to make the investments 
necessary to research and develop new drug products while 
simultaneously enabling competitors to bring cheaper, generic copies 
of those drugs to market.”143  As with any for-profit enterprise, a brand-
name company’s decision to invest in research is driven by economic 
factors.  Because pharmaceutical companies can spend up to $5 billion 
to develop a single drug,144 each drug that enters the market must 
generate enough profit to exceed these costs.  R&D costs, however, are 
not the only financial concerns related to product development.145  A 
 
 140  Wenjun Zhong et al., Age and Sex Patterns of Drug Prescribing in a Defined American 
Population, MAYO CLINIC PROC., July 2013, at 699, 
http://www.mayoclinicproceedings.org/article/S0025-6196(13)00357-1/pdf; 
Qiuping Gu et al., Prescription Drug Use Continues to Increase: U.S. Prescription Drug Data 
for 20072008, NCHS Data Brief No. 42, Sept. 2010, at 6, 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db42.pdf. 
 141  Jon Leibowitz, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Address at the Center for 
American Progress: “Pay-for-Delay” Settlements in the Pharmaceutical Industry: How 
Congress Can Stop Anticompetitive Conduct, Protect Consumers’ Wallets, and Help 
Pay for Healthcare Reform (The $35 Billion Solution) (June 23, 2009), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/pay-delay-
settlements-pharmaceutical-industry-how-congress-can-stop-anticompetitive-conduct-
protect/090623payfordelayspeech.pdf. 
 142  Paris, supra note 5 (noting findings in the 2013 Commonwealth Fund 
International Health Policy Survey). 
 143  Mylan Pharm., Inc. v. FDA, 454 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
aaiPharma Inc. v. Thompson, 296 F.3d 227, 230 (4th Cir. 2002)).   
 144  Herper, supra note 20. 
 145  Brand-name companies are subject to additional financial strains.  For example, 
since 2011, Section 9008 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) “has 
imposed an annual fee on manufacturers and importers of ‘branded prescription 
drugs,’” but “generic drugs approved under ANDAs are not subject to the fee.”  Alan 
M. Kirschenbaum, Final Rule on Branded Rx Drug Fee Treats All NDAs the Same, but IRS 
Might Consider a Special Rule for Pre-Hatch-Waxman Paper NDAs, FDA LAW BLOG (Aug. 24, 
2014, 1:20 PM), http://www.fdalawblog.net/fda_law_blog_hyman_ 
phelps/2014/08/final-rule-on-branded-rx-drug-fee-treats-all-ndas-the-same-but-irs-
might-consider-a-special-rule-for.html.  FDA may require Risk Evaluation Mitigation 
Strategies (REMS) “as part of the approval of a new product, or . . . when new safety 
information arises,” which cause brand-name companies to incur additional costs.  
FDA Basics Webinar: A Brief Overview of Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ 
ucm325201.htm (last visited Jan. 7, 2016); see 21 U.S.C. § 355(p) (2010).  Furthermore, 
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brand-name company may also take into account the likelihood of 
generics’ market entry,146 the cost of future litigations (including 
potential antitrust litigations), and the probability of successful 
settlement(s).147  If the occurrence of future antitrust litigation is so 
unpredictable, companies might overestimate the associated costs and 
shy away from particular research projects altogether.  Even if a brand-
name company decides to engage in R&D, uncertainty as to the 
antitrust legality of settlements may still cause the brand-name 
company to inflate its non-R&D costs.  This overestimation is justifiable 
since the FTC interprets the Actavis decision to be a “significant victory 
for the Commission.”148  Therefore, brand-name companies will likely 
factor in expected costs of antitrust litigations when determining drug 
prices, effectively shifting the costs to consumers.149  Considering the 
profound impacts of pharmaceutical litigations on public health and 
expenses, members of the public affected by Paragraph IV litigations 
can be said to be analogous to class members in class action lawsuits 
who are bound by the terms of settlements. 
The requirement of judicial approval is not an entirely new 
concept.  Professor C. Scott Hemphill has suggested using Rule 23(e) 
settlement procedure as a model to settle Paragraph IV litigations, but 
without exploring the topic in detail.150  Outside the Hatch-Waxman 
regime, the concept of judicial approval has been utilized in various 
contexts to protect defined members of the population.  For example, 
the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1(c) requires a directive similar 
to Rule 23(e) approval process to “settle[], voluntarily dismiss[], or 
compromise[]” a shareholder derivative action.151  The purpose of such 
a requirement is “to safeguard the interests of shareholders not directly 
involved in the action.”152  Another example is New York State’s Not-
 
the ACA provisions mandate drug manufacturers to provide a 50% discount to 
Medicare Part D beneficiaries for brand-name drugs and biologics purchased during 
the coverage gap of Part D.  BARRY R. FURROW, ET AL., HEALTH LAW: CASES, MATERIALS, 
AND PROBLEMS 781 (7th ed. 2013).  Section 2501 of the ACA also increases the rebates 
that must be paid by drug manufacturers for pharmaceuticals covered by Medicaid.  
Id. at 856. 
 146  Murat C. Mungan, Reverse Payments, Perverse Incentives, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 
39 (2013). 
 147  Id. 
 148  Wright, supra note 3. 
 149  Pamela J. Clements, The Hatch-Waxman Act and the Conflict Between Antitrust Law 
& Patent Law, 48 IDEA 381, 401 (2008).  
 150  See Hemphill, supra note 14, at 640. 
 151  FED. R. CIV. P. 23.1(c). 
 152  Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 378 (1st Cir. 1974). 
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for-Profit Corporation Law, which requires a judicial approval 
proceeding before a charitable corporation can dispose of its assets.153  
With the state attorney general serving as a statutory party to the 
proceeding, the purpose of the New York statute is to “ensure that the 
interests of the ultimate beneficiaries of the corporation, the public, 
are adequately represented and protected from improvident 
transactions.”154  Some may argue that a judicial approval requirement 
undermines the general policy favoring private settlements of 
expensive and time-consuming patent litigations.  The Supreme Court, 
however, cautioned against acceding to practical concerns when there 
is “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”155  Within the 
Hatch-Waxman regime, the public interest to balance innovation and 
competition far outweighs the need to settle in private. 
Moreover, there is some indication that sufficient judicial 
intervention in a Paragraph IV settlement may lead a court to conclude 
that the agreement is justified.  In In re Effexor Antitrust Litigation, the 
District Court of New Jersey held that the payment arrangement as 
stipulated in the settlement agreement does not raise anticompetitive 
concerns because the judge who entered a consent decree 
incorporating the settlement agreement did so after soliciting the 
FTC’s view on antitrust issues concerning the agreement, and the FTC 
decided not to object within the prescribed period.156  Courts are 
generally in consensus that “private settlement agreements entered 
into during the pendency of litigation that are neither presented to 
nor approved by the judge presiding over the dispute fall outside the 
ambit of [antitrust] immunity.”157  Nonetheless, it is doubtful that any 
 
 153  N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 511 (McKinney 2014). 
 154  Manhattan Eye, Ear & Throat Hosp. v. Spitzer, 715 N.Y.S.2d 575, 592 (1999).  
 155  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2234 (2013) (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed’n 
of Dentists, 474 U.S. 447, 460–61 (2009)). 
 156  In re Effexor XR Antitrust Litig., No. 11-5479 (PGS) (LHG), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 142206, at *37–41, *76–78 (D.N.J. Oct. 6, 2014).  Note, however, that the 
opinion does not specifically address the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, and the decision 
is based on fact-specific analysis. 
 157  In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 968 F. Supp. 2d 367, 395 (D. Mass. 
2013) (citing Andrx Pharms., Inc. v. Biovail Corp. Int’l, 256 F.3d 799, 818–19 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) and In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 618, 634–36 (E.D. 
Mich. 2000)).  The antitrust immunity being referred to here is called the Noerr-
Pennington doctrine, which “grants antitrust immunity to persons and organizations 
who, with the intent to restrain trade and diminish competition, act in concert to 
petition the government to adopt laws and implement policies that are anticompetitive 
in nature.”  Id. at 394 (citing Allied Tube & Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492, 499 (1988)).  
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consent judgment is per se immune from antitrust scrutiny.158  In In re 
Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litigation, the immunity defense was 
unsuccessful because “it [was] unclear whether the judge could be 
fairly said to have endorsed the terms of the settlement agreements.”159  
Given the current legal climate, if a reliable procedure is available to 
judicially approve settlement agreements, courts would be willing to 
confer immunity to the agreements and thus, the procedure would 
help to curtail complex and expensive antitrust litigations in the 
future. 
The following subsections describe the proposed procedure.  
Subsection A sets the ground rules for settling parties that would be 
applicable throughout the proposed procedure.  The proposed 
procedure consists of two phases: Subsection B discusses the initial 
evaluation phase; and Subsection C describes the formal hearing phase 
that enables members of the public to object to questionable 
settlement agreements.  Subsection D explains the importance of 
keeping the proposed procedure on a strict timeline.  This Comment 
makes no claim that the proposed procedure is ideal, and the 
procedure likely requires further adjustments.  Nonetheless, short of 
amendments to the Hatch-Waxman Act or antitrust laws, a more 
preemptive and drastic approach is necessary. 
A. Conditions Imposed on the Settling Parties 
This Comment proposes to impose three conditions on parties 
who wish to settle.  The first two conditions are meant to encourage 
the parties to negotiate in good faith and to be applied as soon as the 
parties express their intent to settle: (1) the plaintiff (brand-name 
company) may dismiss the case only under the condition that it would 
not preclude the sale of the product proposed in the defendant’s 
ANDA on the basis of the patent at issue; and (2) the defendant may 
not convert its Paragraph IV certification to Paragraph III certification.  
The third condition requires the parties to disclose to the court all 
material information related to the settlement that they are proposing. 
The first condition ensures that the plaintiff brand-name 
company utilizes the proposed procedure in good faith.  As discussed 
more in depth below,160 brand-name companies benefit from staying 
 
 158  Id. at 395 (“There is little guidance, however, on the question of whether a 
judge’s entry of a consent judgment falls squarely within the scope of Noerr-
Pennington.”). 
 159  Id. at 398.   
 160  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
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Paragraph IV actions.  They could abuse the system by filing a 
Paragraph IV suit with little prospect of winning, deliberately dragging 
out the lawsuit until the end of the thirty-month stay, initiating the 
settlement approval process, and finally dismissing the action.  The 
current statutory provision, 21 U.S.C. § 355, discourages such tactics by 
giving the judge a statutory discretion to shorten the thirty-month stay 
period when “either party to the action failed to reasonably cooperate 
in expediting the action.”161  But its deterrent effects are moderate, 
because even if the thirty-month stay is lifted, the patent at issue is still 
in force.  A future lawsuit remains a possibility for the defendant if it 
launches its generic product at risk.  If the generic company 
subsequently files a declaratory action, the legal proceeding would 
prolong the period during which the public is deprived of generic 
drugs.  In a class action, a court approval is required before any 
voluntary dismissal.162  The purpose of this requirement “is to protect 
the interest of non-party class members.”163  Similarly, the proposed 
settlement procedure should take into account the interests of those 
in need of generic drugs.  Thus, the first condition eliminates 
uncertainty as to the legal status of the proposed ANDA product upon 
voluntary dismissal by the plaintiff and allows the generic company to 
enter the market sooner. 
The second condition ensures that the defendant generic 
company negotiates in good faith.  Since the risks associated with 
Paragraph IV challenges are small, a generic company might file a 
Paragraph IV ANDA against a strong patent to induce the brand-name 
patent holder to sue and see how the settlement negotiation plays out.  
If the defendant finds itself in an unfavorable position, it can back out 
by converting its ANDA certification from Paragraph IV to III, which 
attests that the generic company would refrain from selling the 
proposed product until the patent at issue expires.164  This would result 
in dismissal of the action.165  Not only is such practice a waste of judicial 
 
 161  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii) (2010).   
 162  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of any “settlement, voluntary 
dismissal, or compromise of the claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class”).  But 
note, “Rule 23(e) does not require court approval when the parties voluntarily dismiss 
class allegations before class certification.  However, in certain situations in which a 
voluntary dismissal might represent an abuse of the class action process, the court 
should inquire into the circumstances behind the dismissal.”  MANUAL, supra note 132, 
§ 21.61, at 309 n.948. 
 163  See, e.g., Ingram v. Madison Square Garden Ctr., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 426, 428 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).  See also Malcolm v. Cities Serv. Co., 2 F.R.D. 405, 406 (D. Del. 1942).  
 164  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(vii). 
 165  There has been at least one instance where the defendant’s conversion of its 
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resources, but it also exacerbates the power imbalance166 between the 
parties.  Therefore, the second condition fosters bona fide challenges 
to brand-name patents. 
The third condition is the disclosure requirement.  Under Rule 
23(e), parties who agree to settle must “disclose all terms of the 
[proposed] settlement or compromise” to the court presiding over the 
class action.167  The parties must also submit to the court “a statement 
identifying any agreement made in connection with the proposal,”168 
including any undertakings “that, although seemingly separate, may 
have influenced the terms of the settlement by trading away possible 
advantages for the class in return for advantages for others.”169  The 
settling parties may supplement the disclosure with briefs, motions, or 
informal presentations.170 
Similarly, the proposed procedure should require parties to a 
Paragraph IV litigation to submit their proposed settlement agreement 
to the court in which their case is pending.  The proposed agreement 
may be in the form of a summary in lieu of a copy of the actual 
agreement as long as it sufficiently describes all material terms.  The 
court should have discretion to direct the settling parties to submit 
additional materials that “the court considers relevant to its review of 
a proposed settlement.”171  The requested information may include any 
factors indicating the value of the settlement, e.g., the cost of litigation 
or the total present value of monetary and nonmonetary terms.172  The 
 
ANDA certification has resulted in a court dismissal.  See United Therapeutics Corp. 
v. Sandoz, Inc., Nos. 3:12-CV-01617 & 3:13-CV-316, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 121573, at 
*1 n.1 (D.N.J. Aug. 29, 2014), which notes that: 
Plaintiff’s complaints also included allegations that [defendant] Sandoz 
would infringe [the ‘222] patent listed in the [Orange Book] . . . . On 
April 9, 2014, Sandoz converted its paragraph IV certification regarding 
the ‘222 patent to a paragraph III certification.  On June 2, 2014, in 
accordance with that decision, the Court dismissed the counts in 
[plaintiff’s] Complaints alleging infringement of the ‘222 patent without 
prejudice, along with Sandoz’s counterclaims for non-infringement and 
invalidity of the ‘222 patent.  
 166  See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text. 
 167  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s 
notes to 2003 Amendment. 
 168  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3). 
 169  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s 
notes to 2003 Amendment. 
 170  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 320–21. 
 171  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s 
notes to 2003 Amendment. 
 172  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 320.  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory 
committee’s notes to 2003 Amendment (“Settlements involving nonmonetary 
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parties should also be required to disclose any agreement or 
undertakings that, “although seemingly separate, may have influenced 
the terms of the settlement by trading away”173 potential benefits to the 
public. 
The disclosure requirement enables individuals or entities that 
could be affected by the settlement to view pertinent information and 
intervene under certain circumstances before the settlement goes into 
effect.  The affected parties no longer need to scour through public 
records after incurring antitrust injury in hopes of finding useful 
information.  Furthermore, the disclosure requirement enables a court 
to identify any anticompetitive scheme comprising a series of 
settlements174 prior to its fruition because the requirement would be 
imposed on first-filers and subsequent filers alike.  Under Rule 23(e): 
[t]he spirit of [the disclosure requirement] is to compel 
identification of any agreement or understanding that might 
have affected the interests of class members by altering what 
they may be receiving or foregoing.  Side agreements might 
indicate, for example, that the settlement is not reasonable 
because they may reveal additional funds that might have 
been paid to the class that are instead paid to selected 
claimants or their attorneys.175 
Likewise, the disclosure requirement in the proposed procedure 
forces the settling parties to put all potentially related transactions on 
the table, thereby allowing the court to examine the parties’ motives 
and see the big picture.  If any of the side agreements signal an 
anticompetitive concern, the issue can be resolved before an 
anticompetitive harm takes place.  The disclosure requirement also 
spares the settling parties from expensive discovery in antitrust actions 
that could take place years after the settlement is entered. 
Rule 23(e)(3) does not specify sanction for failure to identify an 
agreement or an undertaking connected with the settlement,176 but the 
Federal Judicial Center suggests reopening the approved settlement if 
the unidentified materials bear significantly on the settlement’s 
 
provisions for class members also deserve careful scrutiny to ensure that these 
provisions have actual value to the class.”).  If necessary, the court should give the 
settling parties an opportunity to claim the protection of attorney-client privilege and 
confidentiality.  See MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 319. 
 173  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s 
notes to 2003 Amendment. 
 174  See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
 175  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 319.  
 176  Id. § 21.631, at 320. 
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reasonableness.177  The proposed procedure should simulate this 
sanction by voiding the presumptive legality of an approved agreement 
as described below.178 
B. Initial Evaluation of a Proposed Paragraph IV Settlement 
i. Preliminary Review 
Rule 23(e) requires the settling parties to bear the burden of 
persuading the court that settlement is preferable to litigation by 
showing that their settlement terms are “fair, reasonable, and 
adequate.”179  The presiding court preliminarily reviews the proposed 
settlement agreement and orders a formal hearing (commonly known 
as a “fairness hearing”) only if the court is satisfied with the “fairness, 
reasonableness, and adequacy” of the settlement terms.180  These 
determinations may be made with or without a preliminary hearing,181 
and the court may seek an independent review of provisions that call 
for closer scrutiny.182  The settling parties have an opportunity to 
amend their agreement to overcome the court’s objections.183 
In class actions, factors that may be considered by the court in 
evaluating a proposed settlement agreement vary depending on the 
nature of the suit being settled.184  Some general factors include, but 
are not limited to: “advantages of the proposed settlement” as opposed 
to proceeding with the litigation in light of the merits of the claims;185 
whether any attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are 
 
 177  Id. 
 178  See infra Parts III.B.ii & III.C.iii. 
 179  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.631, at 318.  
 180  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2); MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 321. 
 181  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 320–21. 
 182  Examples of questionable provisions include “unduly preferential treatment of 
class representatives or segments of the class, inadequate compensation or harms to 
the classes, the need for subclasses, or excessive compensation for attorneys.”  Id. § 
21.632, at 321.  
 183  Id. 
 184  Id. § 21.62, at 315. 
 185  Id. § 21.62, at 316. 
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reasonable;186 “the maturity of the underlying substantive issues”;187 “the 
extent of participation in the settlement negotiations by class 
members” or their representatives, “a judge, a magistrate judge, or a 
special master”;188 “the effect of the settlement on other pending 
actions”;189 what other courts have done with similar settlements;190 the 
amount of a monetary relief provided for class members;191 and the 
value of non-monetary relief.192 
Furthermore, the judicial role under Rule 23(e) is limited to 
approving, disapproving, or imposing conditions on a proposed 
settlement.193  In conducting a preliminary review of a class action 
settlement, the court must “adopt the role of a skeptical client and 
critically examine” the terms of the proposed settlement.194  Some 
circuit courts have even stated that “the district court acts as a fiduciary 
who must serve as a guardian of the rights of absent class members.”195  
To this end, Rule 23(e) authorizes the court to appoint a magistrate 
judge, guardian ad litem, special master, court-appointed expert, or 
technical advisor who assists in reviewing the terms of a proposed 
settlement terms, studying how those terms affect the absent class 
members, and determining their fairness, reasonableness, and 
adequacy.196  A court-appointed expert provides testimony and a 
neutral assessment “regarding the valuation of the settlement” or of its 
 
 186  See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h) advisory committee’s notes 
to 2003 Amendment (“Whether or not there are formal objections, the court must 
determine whether a fee award is justified and, if so, set a reasonable fee.”); In re 
Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 628 F.3d 185, 196 (5th Cir. 2010) (“We have repeatedly 
held that a district court abuses its discretion if it approves a class action settlement 
without determining that any attorneys’ fees claimed as part of the settlement are 
reasonable and that the settlement itself is reasonable in light of those fees.”). 
 187  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.62, at 316.  
 188  Id. 
 189  Id. 
 190  Id. § 21.62, at 317. 
 191  Id. 
 192  In re Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 148 F.3d 283, 
316–24 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 193  Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998) (“The settlement 
must stand or fall in its entirety.”); but cf. In re Auction Houses Antitrust Litig., No. 00-
CV-0648, 2001 WL 170792, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2001) (conditioning approval of 
a settlement on parties’ adopting changes specified by the district court). 
 194  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.61, at 310. 
 195  Grunin v. Int’l House of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114, 123 (8th Cir. 1975).  See also 
Reynolds v. Beneficial Nat’l Bank, 288 F.3d 277, 279–80 (7th Cir. 2002); In re Cendant 
Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 2001). 
 196  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 321 & § 21.644, at 329. 
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legality.197  The court must determine whether such testimony will 
“assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or determine a fact 
in issue.”198 
Similar to the Rule 23(e) procedure, the settling parties in the 
proposed procedure should bear the burden of persuading the court 
that their agreement is not unreasonably anticompetitive.  The court’s 
role should be limited to approving or disapproving a proposed 
agreement.  The presiding judge may not draft nor rewrite an 
agreement, though he or she may make suggestions.  In order to 
effectively fulfill its role, the court should appoint at least one neutral 
expert advisor to assist the court in identifying and examining any 
antitrust issues concerning the agreement terms.  This is important to 
ensure the quality of review given the complexities of the Hatch-
Waxman system and antitrust analysis.  Furthermore, as discussed in 
more details below,199 an appointed expert is instrumental in 
facilitating the judicial review as expeditiously as possible. 
Moreover, the court in the proposed procedure should play the 
“role of a skeptical client and critically examine”200 the proposed 
agreement for its potentially anticompetitive effects.  This aspect is 
crucial in order to protect the public interest, especially when the 
adversarial nature of litigation is lost after parties agree to settle.  As 
the Hatch-Waxman Act encourages litigation to resolve patent 
disputes,201 the court’s role as a “skeptical client” helps to retain an 
adversarial flavor to the settlement process and to take into account 
interests of non-parties who would be affected by the settlement.  Also, 
within the proposed settlement framework, courts are in a unique 
position to mitigate the settling parties’ power imbalance.  For 
example, the court may raise concerns when the generic company 
demands payment that is unreasonably high or a market entry date 
that is too soon.  This way, the court can protect the brand-name 
company’s need to recover its investment in research, which ensures 
continued development of new drugs.  Furthermore, by allowing 
generic entry at an appropriate time prior to the patent expiration, it 
can facilitate an equitable and pro-competitive timing to introduce 
lower-cost generic drugs into the market. 
 
 197  Id. § 21.632 at 321.  
 198  FED. R. EVID. 702; see also MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.632, at 321.  
 199  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 200  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.61, at 310.   
 201  This is indicative by the automatic thirty-month stay of ANDA approval and 180-
day exclusivity period for first-filers.  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii), (iv) (2010). 
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The court undertaking the proposed procedure may, just as in the 
Rule 23(e) procedure, evaluate the settling parties’ agreement with or 
without a preliminary hearing.  This Comment, however, proposes to 
diverge from Rule 23 by authorizing the court to issue a final (but 
appealable) approval at this stage.  This suggestion is largely motivated 
by the need to expedite Paragraph IV settlement processes as 
explained below.202  There may be various ways to accomplish this step, 
but this Comment proposes a two-prong analysis: the first prong 
comprising a categorical test; and the second involving the rule of 
reason analysis. 
Under the first prong, the court may apply pre-defined factors to 
decide whether to order a formal hearing.  For example, the court may 
set the threshold “Settlement Competition Index (SCI)” beyond which 
a formal hearing must be ordered.203  If a proposed agreement’s SCI 
falls below a threshold value and thereby fails to trigger a formal 
hearing order, the court may proceed to the second prong.  Since the 
settling parties have the burden of persuasion, they should be required 
to submit any requisite calculations and/or analysis to the court, and 
the court’s advisor may assist the judge in evaluating their work.  With 
the development of case law in the area, this prong should evolve into 
a streamlined process.   
If the triggering factors are not found in the first prong, the court 
should proceed to the second prong and conduct the rule of reason 
analysis, which has been employed in various antitrust cases to 
interpret the federal Sherman Act204 and state antitrust laws.205  In 
applying the rule of reason, the court must balance anticompetitive 
 
 202  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 203  Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1328–48.  Alternatively, a certain amount of 
valuable consideration from the patentee may be a triggering factor.  For instance, the 
amount of considerations may be calculated using the method proposed in Aaron 
Edlin et al., Activating Actavis, ANTITRUST, Fall 2013, at 16, 18.  If the “otherwise 
unexplained” portion of the patentee’s payment exceeds a predetermined limit, a 
formal hearing may be ordered.  See id. 
 204  See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 885 (2007) 
(“The rule of reason is the accepted standard for testing whether a practice restrains 
trade in violation of § 1 [of the Sherman Act].”); Texaco Inc. v. Dagher, 547 U.S. 1, 5 
(2006) (“[T]his Court presumptively applies rule of reason analysis, under which 
antitrust plaintiffs must demonstrate that a particular contract or combination is in 
fact unreasonable and anticompetitive before it will be found unlawful.”); United 
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 400–01 (1948) (“We apply the ‘rule 
of reason’ of Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, to efforts to monopolize 
through patents as well as in non-patent fields.”).  
 205  Wilcox et al., supra note 78, at 869 (discussing that many state laws track the 
Sherman Act). 
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harms and pro-competitive benefits to determine whether the 
proposed agreement as a whole would unreasonably restrict 
competition in the relevant market.206  If the court determines that the 
proposed agreement raises antitrust concerns, it must order a formal 
hearing. 
One advantage of the second prong is that the court may freely 
consider the merits of the case in applying the rule of reason analysis 
because the case being settled is a patent infringement action and thus 
is not bound by Actavis.  This aspect is particularly significant because 
“the likelihood that the patent will be held invalid or not infringed is 
key to evaluating whether a settlement violates antitrust law.”207  It 
would be necessary to take into account the maturity of the underlying 
patent issue and “the probable outcome of a trial on the merits.”208  
Additional factors that the court should consider include, in no 
specific order and with no single factor being dispositive: the proposed 
market entry date of the generic drug;209 whether there are other 
companies that settled with respect to the same drug at issue;210 
whether there are other agreements entered into by the same settling 
parties;211 any other potentially anticompetitive provisions (e.g., no AG 
provision212); the extent of antitrust injury to drug purchasers (e.g., the 
extent of overcharge213); the brand-name company’s market power in 
a defined market;214 the value of net considerations flowing from the 
brand-name company to the generic company;215 and how other courts 
have treated similar settlements in the past.216  With respect to the last 
 
 206  Id. at 840. 
 207  Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1336.  See also supra note 129 and accompanying 
text.  
 208  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.62, at 316. 
 209  See, e.g., supra notes 30, 31, 73 and accompanying text.  See also discussion supra 
Part III.B.i regarding the court’s mitigation of power imbalance.  
 210  See, e.g., supra notes 103–05 and accompanying text. 
 211  See, e.g., supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 212  See supra note 123 and accompanying text. 
 213  See, e.g., supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 214  “[T]he conclusion that a particular tying arrangement involving a patent is 
unlawful ‘must be supported by proof of power in the relevant market rather than by 
a mere presumption thereof.’”  Opderbeck, supra note 72, at 1331 (quoting Illinois 
Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc. 547 U.S. 28, 43 (2006)).   
 215  See, e.g., Edlin et al., supra note 203, at 18 (describing a net consideration as a 
total value of any consideration flowing from the patentee to the claimed infringer 
minus the sum of the patentee’s avoided litigation costs and the value of goods, 
services, or other consideration from the alleged infringer). 
 216  See discussion infra Parts III.B.ii & III.C.iii (discussing the notion that court 
opinions create precedents). 
SEIDEL (DO NOT DELETE) 2/2/2016  1:50 PM 
2016] COMMENT 731 
 
factor, certain forms of settlement may be considered a “safe-harbor.”  
For instance, the Supreme Court stated in Actavis that parties “may, as 
in other industries, settle . . . by allowing the generic manufacturer to 
enter the patentee’s market prior to the patent’s expiration, without 
the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior to that point.”217 
ii. Parties’ Options After Preliminary Review 
Under Rule 23, if a court approves a proposed settlement, an 
order of approval should include the court’s findings and reasoning.218  
An approved agreement is presumed legal, and both the court and the 
parties must abide by the approved settlement terms.219  If the court’s 
decision is appealed, the decision is reviewed under the abuse of 
discretion standard.220  “An abuse of discretion may be found where the 
‘district court’s decision rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, 
an errant conclusion of law, or an improper application of law to 
fact.’”221  Nevertheless, “[w]hether an incorrect legal standard has been 
used is an issue of law to be reviewed de novo.”222 
As discussed earlier, the proposed procedure allows the court to 
issue an official approval if the court concludes, after the two-prong 
analysis, that the proposed agreement does not violate the antitrust 
laws.  Similar to Rule 23(e), the court should be required to publish a 
detailed explanation of the court’s findings and reasons for its 
decision.  This requirement serves the important purpose of building 
precedents.  As more lawsuits are settled via the proposed procedure, 
the settlement procedure would require fewer costs and less time 
because parties and courts can rely on prior decisions.  Settling parties 
may structure their agreements in conformity with past court opinions, 
and this would improve predictability of the volume of future antitrust 
lawsuits in the Hatch-Waxman realm. 
 
 
 217  FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013).  
 218  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 13.14, at 172. 
 219  Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 220  See, e.g., In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 589 F. App’x 53, 58 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“We review a district court’s decision to . . . approve a settlement under the 
abuse of discretion standard.”); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e 
review the determination of the district court [with respect to the approved 
settlement] only for an abuse of discretion.”).  
 221  In re Nutella, 589 F. App’x at 58 (quoting In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 
391 F.3d 516, 527 (3d Cir. 2004) (quoting In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel 
Tank Prod. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d Cir. 1995))).  
 222  Id. (quoting Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 377 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(quoting Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 583, 590 (3d Cir. 2012))). 
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Parties in the proposed procedure should submit their approved 
agreement to the FTC and the Antitrust Division of the United States 
Department of Justice pursuant to the current regulation.223  One 
significant difference from the current practice is that a judicially 
approved agreement in the proposed procedure would be presumed 
legal, and the FTC must appeal the agreement instead of initiating an 
antitrust suit if it wishes to challenge the decision.  Again, this 
arrangement enhances parties’ confidence that the approved 
agreement is legal and reduces future antitrust litigations.224  While the 
appellate court may review the district court’s decision only under the 
abuse of discretion standard, the presumptive legality may be void if 
the settling parties failed to disclose information in connection with 
the agreement prior to the approval either deliberately or 
inadvertently. 
If the judge determines that a formal hearing is required, the 
settling parties should choose to: (1) move forward with the hearing; 
(2) amend the proposed agreement to remove any obstacles to court 
approval within a specified time limit; (3) continue to litigate 
(pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman objectives); or (4) dismiss the case 
under the condition that the plaintiff would not sue the defendant 
based on the product proposed in the ANDA.  If an amendment does 
not result in court approval, the parties must proceed with the formal 
hearing or continue to litigate.  The parties may not appeal at this time. 
C. Formal Hearing 
i. The Court’s Notice to the FTC and the Public 
Under Rule 23, the court must alert all class members to their 
“opportunity to present their views” and hear others’ arguments 
regarding the settlement terms.225  Members who wish to object to the 
settlement (the “objectors”) must file written statements of their 
objections within a specified time and notify the court if they also 
intend to appear at the fairness hearing.226  Class counsel—attorneys 
representing a class—must communicate any proposed settlement 
 
 223  MMA, supra note 13. 
 224  See also infra text accompanying notes 252–54. 
 225  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.633, at 321–22.   
 226  Id. § 21.633, at 322. 
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terms to class representatives227 and, ultimately, to all class members.228  
Class counsel may convey information to class members in a variety of 
ways, such as holding a meeting (especially if the class is small), or by 
creating a toll-free telephone number or a website to provide 
settlement details and court-approved answers to frequently asked 
questions.229  An objector who testifies at the hearing may be “any class 
member who does not opt out” or any party to the settlement, such as 
“a shareholder of a corporation involved in the settlement.”230 
In the proposed procedure, the court should notify (or instruct 
the settling parties to notify) the FTC and members of the public 
before holding a formal hearing.  Notices may be provided in 
publications such as the Federal Register, magazines, newspapers, and 
trade journals.231  It may also be appropriate to post notices on websites 
or “in public places likely to be frequented by” potential objectors.232  
The notice should include, for example, brief descriptions of the 
proposed agreement, where additional information can be found, and 
instructions on how to file objections within a specified time and on 
how to notify the court if the objectors also intend to appear and testify 
at the formal hearing.  Settling parties may initially bear the cost of 
preparing and distributing the notice and later share it with objectors 
in agreed-upon proportions.  Alternative arrangements are also 
possible. 
Objectors should include any members of the public, such as 
consumers, wholesalers, retailers, and insurance companies, regardless 
of their potential status as direct or indirect purchasers.233  Thus, 
members of the public have the opportunity to object to a proposed 
agreement before it could injure them.  Moreover, the presence of 
objectors would help to reinforce the adversarial character of the 
proceeding.234  Any issues must be resolved before the agreement’s 
 
 227  A class representative is “a person named in the complaint as the plaintiff and 
who has been determined by the court to be a legally ‘adequate’ person to represent 
the interests of the class.”  The Federal Class Action Practice Manual, Glossary of Legal Terms 
Used in Class Action Litigation, CLASS ACTION LITIG. INFO., 
http://www.classactionlitigation.com/glossary.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). 
 228  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.641, at 323. 
 229  Id. § 21.641, at 323–24. 
 230  Id. § 21.643, at 326.  
 231  See, e.g., id. § 21.311, at 287–88 (discussing various methods of distributing 
certification notices to unidentifiable class members after reasonable effort). 
 232  Id. § 21.311, at 292.  
 233  The proposed procedure may raise an issue of objector standing.  This 
Comment refrains from exploring the topic. 
 234  See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
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approval.  Those who fail to object during the specified time—
including the FTC—forfeit their right to object, appeal, or initiate an 
antitrust action on the basis of the approved agreement in the future.  
This way, the proposed procedure alleviates settled parties’ concern 
that they might face antitrust liability years after their settlement takes 
place.  Both the objectors and settling parties may rely on previous 
court decisions because the proposed procedure requires all courts to 
prepare written opinions. 
The court may appoint a public counsel, similar to a class counsel, 
to be responsible for overseeing the notification procedure, and 
communicating and coordinating with the objectors to consolidate 
similar arguments.  If no objection is raised within the specified time 
period, the court should still hold a hearing perhaps with its advisor(s) 
as an adversary to the settling parties. 
ii. The Burden-Shifting Approach 
In class action settlements, a court may approve a settlement only 
if it is “fair, reasonable, and adequate.”235  At a Rule 23 fairness hearing, 
settling parties may “present witnesses, experts, and affidavits or 
declarations.”236  Objectors may also testify.237  Objectors may act 
individually or on behalf of class members.238  The court may set time 
limits on objectors’ arguments and refuse “to hear the same objections 
more than once.”239  If objections are withdrawn, the court must 
approve the withdrawal.240  If withdrawn objections result in 
modifications to the settlement terms, the withdrawal is considered as 
part of the settlement.241  The court may grant additional discovery if it 
is necessary for the objectors to demonstrate the inadequacy of the 
settlement.242  The discovery, however, should be limited and 
conditioned on a showing of need.243 
In the proposed procedure, the court should apply the rule of 
reason analysis with a burden-shifting approach at the formal 
hearing.244  The burden-shifting approach would require the objectors 
 
 235  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). 
 236  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.634, at 322.  
 237  Id.  
 238  Id. § 21.643, at 327. 
 239  Id. § 21.634, at 322.  
 240  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(5); MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 328. 
 241  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 328. 
 242  Id. § 21.643, at 327–28. 
 243  Id. § 21.643, at 328. 
 244  James A. Keyte & Karen Lent, Reasonable as A Matter of Law: The Evolving Role of 
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to first demonstrate likely anticompetitive effects of the settlement 
agreement in a well-defined antitrust market.  If the objectors are 
successful, the settling parties must offer a pro-competitive 
justification(s) for their proposed settlement.  If the settling parties are 
successful, the objectors must show that the settling parties’ 
justification(s) can be achieved through materially less restrictive 
alternatives.  If the objectors are successful, the court must weigh the 
overall anticompetitive and pro-competitive effects to determine the 
reasonableness of the settlement agreement.  The court may follow the 
general practice outlined in Rule 23 regarding limited discovery, 
witnesses, experts, affidavits or declarations, and withdrawal.  The 
court must approve withdrawal of any objector,245 and if withdrawn 
objections result in modifications to the settlement terms, the 
withdrawal should be considered as part of the settlement.  Even in the 
absence or scarcity of objections, the court should consider diverse 
interests of the affected parties and requisite factors before reaching 
its decision.246 
iii. Parties’ Options After the Formal Hearing 
According to Rule 23(e), the court must ensure that there is a 
sufficient record of the basis and justification for the court’s 
conclusion247 and explain the findings to class members and the 
appellate court in sufficient written detail.248  As mentioned previously, 
an approved agreement is presumed legal,249 and the court’s decision 
is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard.250  The proposed 
procedure should be set up in a way that improves predictability and 
diminishes the likelihood that settled companies would face future 
antitrust liability.  Therefore, the courts’ decisions in the proposed 
 
the Court in Rule of Reason Cases, ANTITRUST, Summer 2014, at 62, 62 (discussing how 
most courts employ a burden-shifting approach for antitrust claims that are not subject 
to a per se rule or quick look approach); see also Thomas F. Cotter, FTC v. Actavis, Inc.: 
When is the Rule of Reason Not the Rule of Reason?, 15 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 41, 43–44 
(2014).  
 245  See discussion infra Part III.D regarding objectors. 
 246  See MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.635, at 322–23. 
 247  Id.  
 248  FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2) (former FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(3)) advisory committee’s 
notes to 2003 Amendment. 
 249  Klier v. Elf Atochem N. Am., Inc., 658 F.3d 468, 475–76 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 250  See, e.g., In re Nutella Mktg. & Sales Practices Litig., 589 F. App’x 53, 58 (3d Cir. 
2014) (“We review a district court’s decision to . . . approve a settlement under the 
abuse of discretion standard.”); Isby v. Bayh, 75 F.3d 1191, 1196 (7th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e 
review the determination of the district court [with respect to the approved 
settlement] only for an abuse of discretion.”).  
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procedure should also be published, resulting in more consistent 
decisions nationwide.  This would also aid future Paragraph IV litigants 
to structure their agreements if they wish to settle. 
Furthermore, if the court approves an agreement in the proposed 
procedure, the parties to the agreement should be allowed to act 
immediately in accordance with the agreement.  Only those who timely 
objected may appeal the decision.  The agreement is presumptively 
legal and will be reviewed under a deferential standard, i.e., the abuse 
of discretion standard as described above.  As suggested earlier, if the 
settling parties failed to disclose information in connection with the 
agreement prior to the approval, the presumptive legality should be 
void.  A de novo review is proper only in limited circumstances such as 
the parties’ failure to disclose pertinent side agreements or a clearly 
erroneous application of law.  Even if the approved agreement is 
ultimately found unlawful, the settled parties should not be held liable 
in future antitrust suits or penalized for their actions in accordance 
with the agreement during the appeal period. 
If the court disapproves the agreement after the formal hearing, 
the settling parties may: (1) continue to litigate the patent 
infringement case (in accordance with the objectives of the Hatch-
Waxman Act); (2) amend the agreement within a specified time only 
to the extent that it removes or corrects the anticompetitive aspect(s) 
of the agreement; (3) appeal within a specified period; or (4) dismiss 
the case under the condition that the plaintiff will not sue the 
defendant based on the product proposed in its ANDA.  In the interest 
of saving time,251 the amended agreement of option (2) would not be 
subject to a formal hearing, and if it does not result in an approval, the 
parties must: (1) litigate; (3) appeal; or (4) dismiss.  If the proposed 
agreement is rejected on appeal, the parties may not attempt to settle 
or amend again.  The parties must choose between options (1) and 
(4). 
The improved predictability and confidence in the legality of 
their settlements would encourage the brand-name companies to 
invest in R&D and would relieve them from unnecessarily inflating the 
non-R&D costs associated with their drugs.  One commentator on 
reverse payment settlements has proposed a model that demonstrates 
the effect of the shift in legality of reverse payment settlements.252  
According to the model, switching from a regime that legalizes reverse 
payment settlements to a regime that illegalizes the settlements 
 
 251  See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 252  Mungan, supra note 146, at 41–44.   
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increases incentives for brand-name companies to develop stronger 
inventions rather than weaker inventions, therefore strengthening 
their patents.253  The model also shows that a move toward illegalization 
of reverse payment settlement deters generics from entering the 
market when the patent is strong.254  The proposed procedure does not 
illegalize reverse payment settlements, but rather makes it difficult for 
brand-name companies to rely on unlawful ones.  If this model 
accurately forecasts the behaviors of brand-name and generic 
companies, the proposed procedure would encourage strong 
innovation. 
D. A Strict Timeline is Required to Avoid Delays in the Settlement 
Process 
One significant challenge in implementing the proposed 
procedure is to keep the procedure on a strict timeline and not to let 
it serve as a substitute for a stay of Paragraph IV litigations.255  In class 
actions, objections delay final resolution of a settlement by requiring 
the court to consider objectors’ arguments.256  While bona fide 
objectors can be beneficial, as they assist the court in identifying areas 
of a settlement that need improvement,257 the resulting “holdup” 
becomes more severe when objectors appeal, which can take years.258  
Appeals are costly to class counsel as well as to non-objecting class 
members because they are typically not entitled to payment “until the 
legal process has run its course.”259  In contrast, objectors incur 
relatively low cost because their pay is not dependent on settlement 
approval, and they are able to minimize appellate litigation fees by 
recycling widely applicable principles on which to base their 
objections.260  Furthermore, an objector has an occasional incentive of 
winning attorney fees if it succeeds in making changes to the 
settlement in a way that benefits the class.261  The prospect of delay and 
 
 253  Id. at 43–44. 
 254  Id. at 41–42. 
 255  According to one estimate, even a one-year delay in generic entry costs 
consumers about $661 million per drug.  Hemphill, supra note 14, at 650 n.85. 
 256  Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of Objector Blackmail?, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1623, 1624 
(2009). 
 257  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 326. 
 258  Fitzpatrick, supra note 256, at 1624.   
 259  John E. Lopatka & D. Brooks Smith, Class Action Professional Objectors: What to Do 
About Them?, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 865, 865, 882 (2012).   
 260  Id. at 865, 878. 
 261  MANUAL, supra note 132, § 21.643, at 326.  
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financial loss has prompted many class counsels to pay objectors out of 
their own pockets to withdraw the appeals.262  This dynamic has given 
rise to a lawyer-driven phenomenon called “objector blackmail” by 
which class members extract a payoff from class counsel by threatening 
to file meritless appeals.263  Attorneys who routinely seek out class 
actions and object on behalf of class members are called “professional 
objectors,”264 of whom “[f]ederal courts are increasingly weary.”265 
Paragraph IV litigations are different from class actions in this 
regard because monetary awards are typically not involved,266 and 
attorneys for both sides are paid by their clients.  Moreover, a 
settlement holdup would be desirable for both litigants in the Hatch-
Waxman regime.  If the proposed settlement procedure can be 
dragged out as long as possible, the brand-name company benefits 
from maintaining its status quo during that time—i.e., the ability to 
charge monopoly prices—even if the proposed settlement is ultimately 
rejected.  The defendant generic company might play along if it 
believes the later payout would outweigh the overall cost. 
Furthermore, when a brand-name company owns multiple 
patents of varying strengths covering a single drug, both the brand-
name and generic companies would likely benefit from prolonging the 
settlement procedure.  For example, one commentator pointed out a 
situation in which a generic company prevails in a Paragraph IV 
litigation involving a weak patent but there remains a strong patent 
covering the same drug as the weak one.267  Because the strong patent 
continues to block competition, the prevailing generic company is 
effectively barred from marketing its generic product until the 
expiration of the strong patent’s term.  If the generic company is a first-
filer, its victory, which happens long before the expiration of the strong 
patent, would result in a premature period of exclusivity that would 
expire pursuant to the forfeiture provision.268  It would not be feasible 
to wait to file an ANDA against the weak patent until the strong patent 
 
 262  Fitzpatrick, supra note 256, at 1624. 
 263  Id. 
 264  Id. at 1624–25; see also Lopatka & Smith, supra note 259, at 865–66. 
 265  O’Keefe v. Mercedes-Benz USA, L.L.C., 214 F.R.D. 266, 295 n.26 (E.D. Pa. 
2003).  
 266  Note, however, that filing a frivolous claim might result in an award of attorneys’ 
fees to the other party.  See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus., Ltd. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 549 
F.3d 1381, 1391 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (affirming the trial court’s award of over $16 million 
in attorneys’ fees to plaintiff brand-name company because of defendant generic 
firm’s baseless challenge to the brand-name’s patent). 
 267  Herman, supra note 56, at 1789.  
 268  21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(D) (2010). 
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is about to expire because winning the first-filer status is a race against 
other generic companies.  For these reasons, generic first-filers have 
begun to request a stay of the Paragraph IV litigation for the weak 
patent until closer to the expiration date of the strong patent.269  A stay, 
followed by a generic victory, would allow the first-filing generic to 
retain its 180-day exclusivity period and create a bottleneck even after 
the strong patent expires.  This “stay” scheme also benefits the brand-
name company because the exclusivity period running beyond the 
expiry date of the last standing patent works to prevent full 
competition. 
In view of the forgoing, the proposed procedure should proceed 
on a strict schedule and allow extension of deadlines only in 
extraordinary circumstances.  The aforementioned two-prong analysis 
during the preliminary review phase270 and appointment of an expert 
advisor271 are intended to facilitate a timely completion of the court’s 
analysis.  Additional tactics can be implemented to ensure expediency 
of the proposed approval process, such as requiring the settling parties 
to make their submissions as concise as possible, creating a template 
for the court’s opinion, and expediting the appeal process.  The court 
should also have the power to terminate a settlement procedure if it 
finds that settling parties are not negotiating in good faith or to impose 
sanctions on a frivolous objector.  Also, settling parties must be 
prohibited from giving, lending, or promising valuable consideration 
to or for any person, or from inducing another to object or appeal in 
the proposed procedure.  Finally, objectors should be required to 
disclose their sponsors or any inducements they received during a 
relevant time period.  The inducements could come from not only the 
settling parties, but also other generic companies interested in the 
relevant market.  The court should be cognizant of the financial 
relationships among objectors and settling parties when considering 
their arguments. 
 
 269  Herman, supra note 56, at 1789, 1808–13 (describing two cases involving a 
motion to stay: Abbott Labs. v. Matrix Labs., Inc., No. 09-CV-1586, 2009 WL 3719214, 
at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 5, 2009), and Millennium Pharm., Inc. v. Teva Parenteral Meds., 
Inc., Nos. 09-CV-105, 09-CV-204, 10-CV-137, 2010 WL 1507655, at *1 (D. Del. Apr. 14, 
2010)).  In Abbott, the district court granted the defendant’s motion to stay the 
Paragraph IV litigation for five years, which is about two years before the latest expiring 
patent was set to expire.  In Millennium, the court denied the defendant’s motion to 
stay the Paragraph IV litigation for about two years. 
 270  See discussion supra Part III.B.i regarding the two-prong analysis. 
 271  See discussion supra Part III.B.i regarding expert advisor. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The current method of settling Paragraph IV litigations is replete 
with problems.  Because the Actavis framework is full of uncertainties, 
settling parties currently cannot ensure the antitrust legality of their 
agreements.  Parties who have settled could be subject to antitrust 
scrutiny several years after the settlement, which requires them to 
revisit their settled case and incur additional costs.  The power 
imbalance between brand-name and generic companies in Paragraph 
IV litigations, as well as the anticipated antitrust lawsuits, may cause 
brand-name companies to divert resources from R&D and shift costs 
to consumers.  On the other hand, affected members of the public 
cannot intervene before Paragraph IV settlements are finalized and are 
unable to escape the effects of the settlement terms.  Many consumers 
who are injured as a result of a Paragraph IV settlement have no legal 
recourse under the indirect purchaser rule, and even those consumers 
who are entitled to bring an antitrust action may not have access to 
relevant information. 
The proposed procedure modeled after Rule 23(e) attempts to 
alleviate these problems.  For parties to Paragraph IV settlements, the 
proposed procedure provides a process through which these parties 
can obtain judicial approval of their agreement.  Once approved, the 
agreement is presumptively legal, which protects the settled parties 
from future antitrust scrutiny.  Moreover, since courts would be 
required to issue an opinion describing their reasons for approval or 
disapproval of each proposed agreement, parties who wish to settle in 
the future would be able to utilize past court decisions as a guide to 
structure their agreement. 
The proposed procedure also addresses some of the public’s 
concerns.  First, settling parties would be required to submit their 
proposed agreement to the court before they can settle.  The court has 
the authority to reject any unreasonably anticompetitive agreement 
and therefore prevent antitrust injury to the public.  Second, settling 
parties must also submit any ancillary agreements in connection with 
their proposed agreement.  This obviates the need for interested 
members of the public to search for related side deals.  If settling 
parties fail to disclose any material information, their agreement would 
lose its presumptive legality.  Third, the proposed procedure provides 
an opportunity for members of the public to object to a proposed 
agreement before it goes into effect.  Fourth, the settling parties must 
adhere to a strict timeline, and the parties’ options become limited 
once they express their intent to settle.  This restricts the parties’ ability 
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to manipulate the settlement procedure. 
The proposed procedure is intended to improve certainty as to 
the antitrust legality of Paragraph IV settlements and prevent 
unnecessary injury to the public.  This Comment makes no claim that 
the proposed procedure is ideal, and it would likely require further 
adjustments.  Nonetheless, the current mechanisms for settlement and 
antitrust enforcement do not adequately balance the competing needs 
to promote pharmaceutical innovation and to protect the public 
welfare.  A more preemptive and drastic approach is necessary and 
desirable, especially in the absence of changes to the Hatch-Waxman 
Act or antitrust laws. 
 
